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1.
《International Journal of Research in Marketing》2022,39(3):867-887
This article examines peer influences from network relationships within a social network game (i.e., embeddedness) and across such games (i.e., multiplexity). Drawing on social influence theory, we develop a bivariate Poisson model of users’ repeated visits and latent attrition that accommodates peer interaction after controlling for homophily. We estimate the model using data from two social network games with considerable overlap among network members. We find that friends who are only multiplex across games exert greater peer influence on users’ game visits than members who are embedded within a single game. We also determined that ignoring network multiplexity across games may lead firms to mistarget users due to biased peer influences of embedded friends. This result provides an unresearched explanation—strength of peer influence—for the mixed findings in previous literature on network embeddedness. We utilized our results to conduct several scenario analyses to demonstrate how firms can effectively manage users’ engagement and target users in multiple social network games. 相似文献
2.
This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US. 相似文献
3.
Frdric Koessler 《Games and Economic Behavior》2004,48(2):1053-320
This paper provides a model for the study of direct, public and strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. We propose an equilibrium concept which takes into account communication possibilities of exogenously certifiable statements and in which beliefs off the equilibrium path are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility correspondences, without making reference to perturbed games. Properties of such an equilibrium and of revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown that our equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive form game with communication. Finally, sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing or non-revealing equilibria are characterized in some classes of games. Several examples and economic applications are investigated. 相似文献
4.
Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University. 相似文献
5.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
6.
The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed Games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
An earlier article, drawing on the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes, extends and generalizes game theory (GGT). The theory has been used to conceptualize and analyze diverse social relationships, roles, and games as particular types of rule complexes.For instance, a social role, as a major basis of a parent's action in a game, consists of at least four key components – which are mathematical objects – in the determination of action: value complex, model of reality (including beliefs and knowledge bases), a repertoire of acts, routines, programs, and strategies, and modality, a role-specific algorithm for determining or generating action in game settings. This article applies and extends GGT in analyses of a market bargaining game (a type of open game) and of the classical game of prisoners' dilemma (a type of closed game). The applications show the concrete effects of social embeddedness on game structuring, game interaction patterns and outcomes, and social equilibria. 相似文献
7.
Oliver Koppel 《Economics of Governance》2005,6(3):229-243
This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting.
Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional
quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision
game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case
spillovers are small (large).
Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004
JEL Classification:
H11, H41
I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this
paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
8.
首先,阐述了寻租理论的发展及其危害;然后,借助博弈论作为分析工具,讨论了上市公司与审计机构寻租的成本、概率以及处罚力度等因素对纳什均衡解的影响;最后,给出了治理寻租行为的对策建议。 相似文献
9.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):903-905
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
10.
Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model
are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption
of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary
to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001 相似文献