粤港澳大湾区制造业集聚与区域创新

以2009—2020年粤港澳大湾区11个城市为研究对象，探讨制造业集聚与区域创新的关系。研究发现，制造业集聚显著提高区域创新水平，可通过提高企业竞争这一路径实现。进一步分析发现，金融业集聚对区域创新发展具有显著的正向关系，金融产业和制造业产融协同集聚显著提高区域创新水平。研究结果表明，制造业集聚加剧产业内部企业创新竞争，带动区域创新发展，且金融业在创新中起到积极的推动作用。指出应鼓励区域企业创新竞争，优化营商环境，为产业融合发展提供保障。     

Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.     

Outward foreign direct investment by Polish state-owned multinational enterprises: is ‘stateness’ an asset or a burden?

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly associated with undue advantages due to preferential treatment by the state. Simultaneously they are often quoted as handicapped given the notorious state interference, management problems and agency tensions. They used to be regarded as a mainly domestic issue but in the context of globalisation and the fact that states enter treaties with new obligations, SOEs’ performance ceased to be solely a domestic problem, increasingly so as state-owned multinational enterprises (SOMNEs) emerge. This article presents the results of research on Polish SOEs’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). It offers an overview of overseas activities of nine major Polish firms with a state stake and aims to contribute to the conceptual literature on foreign investments conducted by SOMNEs. We distinguish between FDI by SOMNEs as specific – privileged (facilitated) or discriminated (hampered) – investments subject to the home country’s state power and the host country’s state perception.     

Methodological Advances in DEA: A survey and an application for the Dutch electricity sector

We survey the methodological advances in DEA over the last 25 years and discuss the necessary conditions for a sound empirical application. We hope this survey will contribute to the further dissemination of DEA, the knowledge of its relative strengths and weaknesses, and the tools currently available for exploiting its full potential. Our main points are illustrated by the case of the DEA study used by the regulatory office of the Dutch electricity sector (Dienst Toezicht Elektriciteitswet; Dte) for setting price caps.     

浅谈行政事业单位国有资产的有效管理

目前我国国有资产管理主要侧重于经营性资产，行政事业单位的非经营性资产管理仍处于模糊状态。加强行政事业单位国有资产的有效管理，应改革管理体制，健全机构、明确职责，全面清产核资，加强资产配置、使用、处置等环节的管理。     

化解国有企业过度负债的措施

本文针对国有企业过度负债问题,提出了三方面的解决措施。     

规范、有序、健康推进国企改制

本文从规范、有序、健康推进国有企业改制与国企改制大局关系的视角,对国务院国资委《关于规范国有企业改制工作意见》作了深入的解读分析,提出了国有企业改制需要正确处理好的几个关系。     

建国以来非公有制经济政策变迁分析

新中国建立以来,非公有制经济政策经历了曲折的发展过程.党的思想路线对非公有制经济政策的制订起着关键的作用,非公有制经济观以及国际环境是促进党的非公有制经济政策变迁的重要诱因.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.