Learning and the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank

This paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. We assume that policy makers have to “learn” the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by “stickiness” in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity, exports and foreign price. We find that a switch from an “asymmetric” inflation targeting strategy to an “symmetric” makes little difference in welfare payoffs, but it comes at a cost of much higher interest-rate variability. We also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation-targeting strategy based on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the HICP.     

Real exchange rate targeting and macroeconomic instability

Using an optimizing model of a small open economy, this paper studies the macroeconomic effects of PPP rules whereby the government increases the devaluation rate when the real exchange rate—defined as the price of tradables in terms of nontradables—is below its long-run level and reduces the devaluation rate when the real exchange rate is above its long-run level. The paper shows that the mere existence of such a rule can generate aggregate instability due to self-fulfilling expectations. The result is shown to obtain in both flexible- and sluggish-price environments.     

Price Rigidity and the Selection of the Exchange Rate Regime

We evaluate and qualify Friedman's, 1953, “case for flexible exchange rates” in the presence of sticky prices in a two country model. We find that a flexible regime performs indeed better when the degree of nominal price rigidity is high while a bilateral peg does better when prices are fairly flexible. This result obtains independent of whether monetary policy is activistic or not and is mostly due to the negative relationship between employment and productivity shocks when prices are relatively sluggish (Gali, 1999). A unilateral peg tends to produce the lowest level of world welfare but it sometimes represents the best monetary arrangement for the pegger. JEL Classification Numbers: E32, E52, F33, F42     

Union security rights at the polls: A call for modeling right-to-work voting

From 1944 to 1986, 19 states held 27 referendums on right-to-work legislation, with 22.5 million people voting on the proposals. Despite its prominence as a public issue, most research on right-to-work laws focuses on their industrial relations impacts, and not on employees’ individual rights to refrain from joining unions or those same employees’ responsibilities to support their bargaining unit representative. Nor has there been any research on what citizen groups determine those rights and responsibilities in a right-to-work referendum. This study explores a potential operational model of anti-right-to-work voting with a multiple regression analysis of Missouri’s 1978 right-to-work election results, and hopes to serve as a stimulus to additional research on these particular dimensions of the right-to-work issue.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

Hybrid Inflation-Price-Level Targeting in an Economy With Output Persistence

This paper investigates hybrid inflation‐price‐level targeting (HT), employing a Phillips curve with output persistence. By HT we mean that a central bank targets a weighted average of the optimal inflation rate and its corresponding price level. The analysis shows that if output is persistent to some extent, it is desirable to adopt HT because, relative to the case of alternative regimes such as inflation targeting (IT) and price‐level targeting (PT), it will reduce the variability of inflation and thereby social loss. In addition, it is shown that the optimal hybrid‐type target is uniquely determined according to the degree of persistence in output.     

Spatial patterns of poverty in Vietnam and their implications for policy

This study examines the geographic distribution of poverty in Vietnam by applying small area estimation methods to household budget data and population census data. The resulting district-level poverty estimates suggest that the incidence of poverty is highest in the remote northern and central highlands and lowest in the south-east and in large urban centres. However, mapping the density of poverty reveals that most poor people do not live in the poorest districts but in the two lowland deltas, where poverty incidence is intermediate. The policy implications of these findings present an important trade-off between targeting poor areas and poor people that can only be resolved with better information on the relative costs of delivering different programmes and their expected impact. Existing government estimates of poverty at the district level are not closely correlated with our poverty estimates, perhaps because of regional variation in their methods of collecting poverty data.     

Deconstructing credibility: The breaking of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Can political interference deconstruct credibility that was hardly-earned through successful stabilization policy? We analyze the recent switch in the conduct of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Brazil is the largest Emerging Market Economy to formally target inflation, having adopted the Inflation Targeting (IT) regime in 1999. In the early years of IT, the BCB engaged in constructing credibility with price setting agents and succeeded to anchor inflation expectations to its target even under adverse conditions such as exchange rate crises. We argue that this effort to maintain IT rules-based policy ended in 2011, as a new country president and BCB board came to power. We then discuss the consequences of this credibility loss. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) we provide strong empirical evidence of the BCB’s shift toward looser, discretionary policy after 2011; (ii) preliminary evidence suggests that this shift has affected agents’ inflation expectations generating social and economic costs.