Environmental Policy,Sustainable Development,Governance Mechanisms and Environmental Performance

We investigate the effects of environmental policy (Climate Change Act – CCA), sustainable development frameworks (Global Reporting Initiative – GRI; UN Global Compact – UNGC) and corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on environmental performance (carbon reduction initiatives – CRIs; actual carbon performance – GHG emissions) of UK listed firms. We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique to analyse data consisting of 2245 UK firm‐year observations over the 2002–2014 period. First, we find that the CCA has a positive effect on CRIs, and this effect is stronger in better‐governed firms. Second, we find that the GRI‐based framework is positively associated with CRIs. Third, we find that firms with poor CG structures have lower actual carbon performance compared with their better‐governed counterparts. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms can symbolically conform to environmental policy (CCA) and sustainable development frameworks (GRI, UNGC) by engaging in CRIs without necessarily improving actual environmental performance (GHG emissions) substantively. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Factors driving embodied carbon in international trade: a multiregional input–output gravity model

ABSTRACT

Concerns about the effects and consequences of climate change have notably increased in recent decades. Despite large advances in the understanding of this phenomenon, further research into the determinants of gas emissions is necessary, to shed light on the responsibilities of producers and consumers, and their potential contribution to mitigation strategies. This paper studies the trajectories and determinants of carbon embodied in world trade during a period of 15 years. Our methodology relies on a multiregional input–output model, environmentally extended. Drawing on data from the World Input–Output Database, we estimate embodied emissions in bilateral flows. Then, we assess the determinants of CO₂ emissions embodied in trade, combining input–output modelling with trade gravity panel data analysis. This paper offers a methodological approach that explains and quantifies the underlying factors of carbon trade, integrating the production and consumption perspectives and considering the geographical, structural and institutional context of countries.     

Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

Based on the day-night PM_2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.     

碳排放交易制度的节能减排路径：效率提升还是结构转型？——来自中国省级数据的准自然实验

以中国2013年以来实行的碳排放交易试点政策作为准自然实验事件，基于2000-2017年中国30个省市的面板数据，运用双重差分法实证检验碳排放交易制度的节能减排效应及影响机制。研究发现，碳排放交易制度有利于实现中国经济“节能”与“减排”的双重目标，并通过了一系列稳健性检验；作用机制检验表明，能源效率提升和能源结构转型都是碳排放交易制度实现节能减排目标的重要路径；能源效率提升在碳排放交易制度实现“节能”和“减排”中分别发挥了10.19%和5.93%的作用，而能源结构转型分别发挥了48.87%和52.95%的作用。这意味着中国碳排放交易制度实现节能减排的主要动力来自能源结构转型，而非能源效率提升。能源结构转型涉及问题更加宏观和深层，这为中国加快推进节能减排进程，特别是完成2030年碳达峰和2060年碳中和的国际承诺提供政策启示。     

Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

从外部性控制策略分析主要环境经济手段的异同

随着世界经济的发展,环境污染问题日益严峻。环境污染是最典型的负外部行为。本文分析了西方经济理论中关于控制环境方面负外部性两种策略的分歧,对比了以这两种策略为理论渊源的排污收费制度和排污权交易制度的异同及各自的适用条件。     

数字经济对我国碳排放的影响研究

基于2013-2020年的30个省份数据构建面板数据模型,从碳排放总量和碳排放强度两个视角研究数字经济发展对区域碳排放的影响。研究发现：数字经济的发展有效地降低了人均碳排放量、碳排放增量与碳排放增速,数字经济与碳排放强度之间存在倒“U”形关系,数字经济与碳排放强度、边际碳排放强度的关系呈现区域性特征,在省域层面数字经济对边际碳排放强度的影响不存在明显的空间效应,数字经济对碳排放增长率的影响存在基于产业结构优化、人口集聚、城镇化的遮掩效应。     

Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Environmental Product Differentiation and Environmental Awareness

In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers (green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it. Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the positive market effect.      

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.