A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.     

竖向地震力的冲量计算法

一般认为地震在地表引起的破坏主要是S波的水平震动,很少考虑地震竖向力的作用。单从考虑地震水平力的作用是不易全面反映震害特征的。提出用冲量法来研究计算竖向地震力,通过对最大竖向地震力分布研究,探讨竖向地震力对建筑物的影响与破坏,为进一步提高工程抗震设计水平提供理论依据。     

商事制度创新:兼论商事制度变迁中的文化约束

商事制度的变迁与人类文化的演进是一个互动的过程。文化在人类活动中产生,又通过人的价值观、习俗和道德等制约着人的商事行为。商事制度的演化受到文化的直接的非正式约束和间接的强制性约束。受知识和能力的限制,文化约束下的商事制度变迁可能是进步的,也可能是退步的。近代商事制度的形成与人的理性商事观、商事精神、契约文化和信用观念密切相关。在商事制度发展的初始阶段,要特别注重运用先进的商文化引导制度的变迁。     

渠道发展新动态及成因分析

归纳新的市场条件下渠道发展的新动态,并从多个维度分析了这些新动态产生的原因,以便为企业的渠道设计决策和渠道管理决策提供参考。     

基于交易费用理论的企业边界纵向一体化研究

交易费用理论认为，企业的最优边界在市场费用等于企业协调成本那一点，交易费用中的企业规模实质上是企业的纵向规模即纵向边界，企业纵向规模的扩张主要通过纵向一体化来实现。虽然纵向一体化能够有效地削弱人的机会主义和有限理性，克服不确定性，降低交易成本，但它并不必然是企业发展的一种好办法，企业发展到一定阶段，纵向分拆策略是有效的。企业的纵向边界呈现扩张与收缩交互进行的局面。     

Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

论制度变迁的成本约束

制度变迁的关键是成本约束，这是制度本身产生的根本性要求。制度变迁是成本和收益相权衡和比较的产物，制度设计和安排必须充分考虑到制度变迁的成本和收益，减少制度变迁的阻力，提高制度运行的效率。     

Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration

Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior, and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism. In this paper I show that asset specificity can be an argument for non‐integration. In a repeated‐game model of self‐enforcing relational contracts, it is shown that when parties are non‐integrated, increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher‐powered incentives.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY

Abstract. This paper examines two important recent developments in the theory of natural monopoly, or more generally the theory of market structure. The first is a series of papers, involving Baumol with various co-authors, investigating the theory of industry structure, whilst the second is particularly associated with the names of Shaked and Sutton, and the relationship they develop between product differentiation and industry structure. The paper surveys and to some extent contrasts these two new approaches.
Baumol et al. 's contribution is seen to be in the area of clarifying the concept of natural monopoly, refining the definitions of multiproduct costs, and developing a notion of social efficiency applicable to industries where economies of scale are important. Shaked and Sutton employ a new definition of natural monopoly unrelated to market size and utilize information about consumers'income distributions to develop their notion of vertical product differentiation and natural oligopoly.     

论政府包办型生态建设补偿机制的低效性成因及应对策略

政府主导型生态建设的资金投入通过政府委托代理链最终到达“种树人”环节。由于链条本身存在重复性大规模剥蚀资金的缺陷,当资金到达最终环节时,往往因数量的大幅减少而陷入高成本低收益困境。即使那些能够到达最终环节的资金,也会因补偿机制的不适当而缺乏效率。如何克服这种由政府包办而形成的低效率补偿机制?基本途径是让资金运动绕开政府委托代理链,直接到达最终环节,实行治理成果与补偿机制直接挂钩的激励与约束机制。