Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.     

The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Do pensions foster education? An empirical perspective

The paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending. On the one hand, ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education, as an increasing number of retirees results in ‘intergenerational conflict’ and, hence, the condemnation of education expenditure. On the other hand, ageing, in combination with pay-as-you-go pension systems, offers incentives for the working-age generation to invest in the public education of the young in order to ‘reap’ the benefits (that is, higher income tax/contributions) of their greater future productivity. Empirical evidence derived from the application of a fixed effects approach to panel data for OECD countries shows that the increasing share of elderly people has a non-linear effect on education spending. This indicates a certain degree of intergenerational conflict. Nevertheless, we find that future population ageing, which reinforces the mechanism linking public education and pensions, reflects positively on education expenditure. Furthermore, by disaggregating total education expenditure by educational levels, we observe that this effect is led by levels of non-compulsory education, probably as a reflection of the direct connection to labor productivity.     

信息技术提高企业组织敏捷性的作用机理

从考察企业组织的敏捷性与交易成本的相互关系入手,对企业组织敏捷性的影响因素进行了剖析。详细分析了信息技术(IT)对提高企业组织敏捷性的作用机理。指出IT正是通过降低企业内、外部的交易成本、缩短流程时间、提高人的认识理性、扼制机会主义、促进企业组织结构、决策方式     

Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.     

浅析公共服务有效供给的新模式

通过对公共服务的属性分析，结合新政治经济学理论和政府失败的现实因素，探索公益物品的有效供给模式，提出了公共服务的签约转包机制，并分析了这一机制的不足和政府的作用。     

完善欠发达地区在区域不平衡发展中的促动机制

区域不平衡发展是一个普遍的规律,欠发达地区应根据不平衡发展理论,吸取经验教训,建立科学的不平衡发展促动机制。     

以风险协议为框架的化工措施管理机制探索与实践

以西方经济学中的代理理论为基础．建立了一套以风险协议为框架、对化工措施全过程进行控制的管理机制和相应的保证体系，提高了化工措施现场实施的成功率和有效率。     

基于高校教师职业特点的激励机制探析

在对高校教师激励机制现状分析之后,针对高校教师的职业特点,提出了高校教师激励机制模式:薪酬激励、社会保障计划、参与激励、竞争激励、组织文化激励、工作激励。     

防范合谋的激励机制研究综述

通过对合谋内涵、舍谋成因以及防范合谋的激励机制设计三个方面的国内外主要文献进行的回顾与述评结果发现，我国在防范合谋的激励机制设计方面主要存在下列问题：国内许多文献认为信息不对称是合谋的成因，但实际上合谋的成因是互惠，信息不对称只是为合谋提供了条件；现有理论主要从激励经济学角度研究防范合谋的机制设计的，但人类行为动机的产生和发展、变化是一个复杂、微妙的心理过程，仅从激励角度研究合谋问题不足以取得满意的效果。