产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

China and international market integration: Evidence from the law of one price in the Middle East and Africa

We model market integration in the Middle East and Africa by analyzing price dispersion and testing the law of one price (LOP) on highly-comparable actual local retail prices of 135 goods and services across 23 countries in the region over the period of 1990–2016. Second-generation panel estimators are applied to four price benchmarks: Regional average, South Africa, China, and US prices. Cross-regional price dispersion diminishes considerably over time up to 2008, particularly for non-tradeables around China price. The test of LOP indicates the percentage of convergent prices is highest in China price benchmark, followed by US, South Africa, and regional average benchmarks. Direct estimation of the convergence speed confirms this order. Overall, the results show evidence of increasing market integration in Middle East and Africa but it appears to be driven by global forces and, especially, the rise of China as a new economic power. The results show that some emerging market economies, such as China, can step up and promote integration while traditional economic powerhouses, such as the USA and UK, disengage from international economic relations.     

信贷管制、隐性契约与贷款利率变相市场化——现象与解释

本文将视角聚焦于利率市场化改革之前,重点研究金融抑制对银企信贷契约的异化。研究发现,在金融抑制背景下银企之间存在以留存贷款为表现的隐性契约,用以帮助银行在满足管制要求的同时追求利润最大化。本文对这一现象进行了理论分析与实证检验,发现隐性契约的发生与否会随着货币政策、企业特征等因素的改变而有所差异,这在一定程度上起到了利率变相市场化的作用。进一步研究则发现,这一隐性契约对企业价值产生了负向影响。     

金融信用之法律制度支撑——一个法经济学视角的解读

金融活动的存在与正常运转有赖于良好的信用制度与法治环境,金融信用是金融业赖以生存的基础。良好的金融信用依靠多种因素的支持,法律制度的健全是关键。本文主要从法经济学的视角提出构建完善的金融信用法律制度体系,以此防范金融信用风险,保障国民经济的增长与发展,进而促进社会的安全与稳定。     

Some Cracks in the Empire of Chance (Flaws in the Foundations of Reliability)

Making quantified statements about the uncertainty associated with the lifelength of an item is one of the most fundamental tasks of reliability assessment. Most practitioners routinely do this using one of the several available statistical techniques. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. The first is to give the user an overview of the key tenets of two of the most commonly used parametric approaches. The second is to point out that these commonly used approaches involve strategies that are either ad hoc, or are in violation of some of the underlying tenets. A method that is devoid of logical flaws can be proposed, but this method is difficult to implement. The user must therefore resign to using that technique against which the fewest objections can be hurled.     

论经济法的国家安全职能

国家经济安全是整个国民经济持续、健康、快速发展的前提，它可以被分为宏观经济安全和发展安全。要使一个国家经济能够安全运转，就需要强有力的保障措施。安全是法律持续性的制度安排，是一切法律的首要价值，所以保障国家经济安全，法律责无旁贷。在众多法律部门中，经济法作为国家干预经济的法律，目的就是克服市场调节的弊端，保障国家的经济安全。     

基于Stackelberg均衡的第三方物流分包质量合同模型

如何管理、控制分包商的运作质量,使之符合第三方物流服务需求方的质量标准,本文在AlfredssonM构建的第三方物流提供者与分包商之间的Nash均衡模型的基础上,从第三方物流提供者与分包商的决策行为出发,提出了基于stackelberg均衡的第三方物流服务分包质量合同模型,并比较了第三方物流提供者和分包商对Nash均衡博弈结构和stackelberg博弈结构的决策取向。     

企业契约形式、财权安排与财务治理演进

本文认为,企业契约形式与财权安排及财务治理具有非常密切的内在联系。对我国不同时期企业契约形式的考察,发现财权安排具有内在逻辑,企业财务治理在不同历史时期具有不同的演进特征。     

Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal

We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the principal, regardless of her type, gains by not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. The equilibrium allocation transfers some ex-ante risk from one type of agent to the other. Despite the increase in the principal's surplus, allocative efficiency does not necessarily improve. Received: 26 January 2004, Accepted: 5 May 2005 JEL Classification: C72, D23, D82 I would like to thank my supervisor Leonardo Felli for suggestions and Leo Ferraris for helpful discussions. All remainig errors are my own.     

Are generalized call-spreads efficient?

In order to explain coexistence of a deductible for low values of the loss and an upper limit for high values of the loss in insurance contracts, we consider the exchange of risk between two rank dependent expected utility maximizers. It is shown that if the insurer (insured) takes more into account the lowest outcomes – hence maximal losses – than the insured (insurer), then the optimal contract has an upper limit (includes a deductible for high values of the loss). If furthermore, the insured (insurer) neglects the highest outcomes while the insurer (insured) does not, the optimal contract includes a deductible (full insurance) for low values of the loss.