家族企业公司治理文化探析

家族企业已成为我国经济发展中一支不可缺少的有生力量,而公司治理文化将直接影响到家族企业的发展.文章分析了家族企业的公司治理文化的特征、根基及利弊.     

Employer Penalties for Failure to Provide Individual Employee Notification Under the Family and Medical Leave Act: “Clarifications” Following Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.

This article examines the Supreme Court's ruling in Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc. (2002) and considers its implications for employer and employee rights and responsibilities relative to implementing the FMLA policies. We provide an overview of the pre-decision regulatory environment including the general leave provisions of the FMLA and DOL's regulations requiring employer notification of leave designated as FMLA leave. We also identify those provisions that the decision did not alter and provide a broader consideration of the issues and implication of this decision for employers and employees.     

家族式治理对公司理财行为的影响机制研究

家族企业已经越来越受到人们的重视。在现有文献的基础上,论文以所有权和控制权为两维对家族企业做了严格的定义和划分,并把研究对象界定在拥有高控制权的家族式企业。通过将家族式治理和公司理财分析范式结合分析,家族式治理中的网络式组织结构、封闭式的股权结构和作为家族意愿体现的董事会治理机制对家族企业理财行为产生影响。家族式治理对公司理财行为产生正面影响,但由于其自身的局限性和家族企业所处环境的变化,家族式理财必须进行变革:非家族化的理财方式变革,家族规则与现代市场游戏规则的融合,引入有效专家理财制度,以及对家族式理财的扬弃。     

The influences of governance quality on equity-based entry mode choice: The strengthening role of family control

This study examines the possible heterogeneity of governance quality's influence on entry mode decisions made by firms with different degrees of family control. When entering a country with low governance quality, ceding control of the subsidiary in exchange for local partners’ help enables foreign firms to tackle institutional flaws. However, such a motivation diminishes as governance quality increases. This study thus hypothesizes that firms tend to choose WOSs over JVs when entering a host country with high governance quality.Firms controlled by family members, due to concerns regarding the preservation of socioemotional wealth, prefer to maintain high ownership levels of their affiliates. This study thus hypothesizes that firms with a higher degree of family control are even more likely to choose WOSs when entering a country with high governance quality. The results support the hypotheses.     

Corporate Name Change and the Market Valuation of Firms: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Investors’ responses to a firm’s name change and the determinants of their response are scantly explored areas in the field of behavioral finance. Based on a sample of 415 Indian firms from 2005 to 2014, this study suggests that investors respond positively to the announcement of firm name changes. Furthermore, the study indicates that when firms do not indicate geographical specificity in the name and have a specific rather than generic name, then the firm will experience greater abnormal returns. Also, when firm names are fluent and are associated with the owner’s family name, again, abnormal returns generated are positive. Nevertheless, as a firm ages and investors gain more information about it, then abnormal returns due to name change decrease.     

Corporate governance in family firms,learning and reaction to recession: Evidence from Italy

This paper focuses on the interaction between internal and external factors explaining performance of small and medium-sized family firms. We used framework foresight to suggest how learning and internal factors such as CEO’s origin, tenure and turnover, could affect the firm’s reactions to one particular external factor, economic recession. The paper draws on empirical observations of a large sample of small and medium family firms operating in Italy between 2002 and 2011 to identify the baseline future, an expected future for these firms. This analysis may be of interest to both management scholars and practitioners. We hope to contribute to the debate on how internal and external factors interact to affect firm success, measured as sales growth. The implications for the future viability of an economic system based on family businesses are straightforward, as the turbulence and instability of the economic environment has grown significantly in the last decade, especially in more developed countries. Whether the ability of a company to adapt and survive to negative shocks depends on its governance provides a rationale for exploring alternative perspectives on the competitiveness of the economic system and the ability of different owners to cope with future negative events.     

The role of family management and ownership on semi-globalization pattern of globalization: The case of family business groups

Employing a multi-level with longitudinal concern data analysis this research examines the impact from family management and ownership on semi-globalization pattern of globalization in family business groups from an integrated framework. The results reveal that the more likelihood that the controlling family utilize family management in the subsidiary, and the higher degree of pyramidal ownership in the subsidiary, the more likelihood that the family business group will choose to engage in the host regions. Additionally, family management and pyramidal ownership is positively related with the choice to engage in a higher difference region instead of a lower difference region in family business groups. The theoretical and future research implications of these findings for family enterprises and globalization research are discussed.     

Family firm succession and performance

We analyse more than half a million businesses from the Census Bureau’s 2007 Survey of Business Owners with less survivorship and size biases. After controlling for firm- and owner-specific characteristics, we find family businesses generate fewer receipts and less employment and payroll. Family businesses involving a second-generation owner-manager show better performance. On the other hand, those managed by founder-owners show worse performance. These results of all firms, mostly small businesses, are contrary to the previous studies of large public firms. However, for a subsample of 2064 businesses large enough to be listed on a US stock exchange, the results become consistent with the previous large-firm studies.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Social capital and innovation in family firms: The moderating roles of family control and generational involvement

Drawing on the social capital literature, we examine whether the co-existence of distinct yet interacting social groups, namely family and non-family members, creates the conditions for increased family firm innovation. In particular, we theorize that family and non-family social capital have a joint positive effect on family firm innovation and this joint effect is stronger than the single effects of family and non-family social capital. In addition, we predict that while family control has a positive moderating effect, generational involvement has a negative moderating effect on the above-mentioned relationship. With supportive empirical results, our research makes important contributions to the existing literature.