What is extreme about Mises’s extreme apriorism?

There is something extreme about Ludwig von Mises’s methodological apriorism, namely, his epistemological justification of the a priori element(s) of economic theory. His critics have long recognized and attacked the extremeness of Mises’s epistemology of a priori knowledge. However, several of his defenders have neglected what is (and what has long been recognized by his critics to be) extreme about Mises’s apriorism. Thus, the argument is directed less against Mises than against those contributions to the secondary literature that assert his methodological moderation while overlooking what the most prominent critics have found extreme about Mises’s apriorism. Defending Mises as a merely moderate apriorist because he held only a narrow part of the foundation of economics to be a priori is a straw-man defense against criticisms of his apriorism as epistemologically extreme.     

Local Powers of Optimal One‐sample and Multi‐sample Tests for the Concentration of Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin Distributions

One‐sample and multi‐sample tests on the concentration parameter of Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin distributions on (hyper‐)spheres have been well studied in the literature. However, only little is known about their behaviour under local alternatives, which is due to complications inherent to the curved nature of the parameter space. The aim of the present paper therefore consists in filling that gap by having recourse to the Le Cam methodology, which has recently been adapted from the linear to the spherical setup. We obtain explicit expressions of the powers for the most efficient one‐ and multi‐sample tests. As a nice by‐product, we are also able to write down the powers (against local Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin alternatives) of the celebrated Rayleigh test of uniformity. A Monte Carlo simulation study confirms our theoretical findings and shows the empirical powers of the above‐mentioned procedures.     

On uniform convergence of undiscounted optimal programs in the Mitra–Wan forestry model: The strictly concave case

In this paper, we show that the 1986 Mitra–Wan result establishing asymptotic convergence of maximal programs to the unique golden-rule forest in the case of undiscounted, strictly concave felicity functions can be strengthened, in the same setting, to the  uniform  asymptotic convergence of  optimal  programs to the unique golden-rule forest. We work with a notationally reformulated version of the model that may have independent interest.     

The Distributional Properties of the Debt to Equity Ratio: Some Implications for Empirical Research

The purpose here is to assess empirically the quasi-supply side model of the firm developed in the paper by Ashton et al. (2004 ) by testing the prediction of the model that the evolution of a firm's debt to equity ratio will be compatible with a non-linear (target adjustment) process whose underlying probability density function possesses no convergent moments. Using a thirty-two-year history of the debt to equity ratio for each of ninety 'mature' United Kingdom firms, a non-parametric estimation procedure shows that the debt to equity ratio evolves in terms of a process which is largely consistent with the predictions of this model. In particular, the evolution of the debt to equity ratio is compatible with a 'long (fat) tailed' density function with no convergent moments. This has the important implication, supported by our empirical analysis, that the linear dynamic models which characterize empirical work in this area will be mis-specified and will return inconsistent and temporally unstable estimates of the target adjustment process as a consequence.     

The distinction between commercial and non-commercial bus services in Germany: Given by nature?

German public transport services by bus are characterized by a regulatory framework that distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial services. Contrary to the apparent views of legislators, this paper shows that costs and revenues are not the only parameters determining whether or not operators are able to provide services in a commercially viable way.Apart from the local characteristics of the specific service, we show that the classification of services as commercial versus non-commercial is determined in large part by the public transport authorities that set minimum quality standards to be provided by operators. Our analysis shows that the authorities awarding the contracts in some cases affect market organization significantly depending on how they make use of this power. Furthermore, market organization differs substantially with respect to the awarding structure and the contractual relationships, thus creating a challenge for operators and authorities in an embryonic market.     

THE ESSENCE OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL

In a lecture in November 2008, Professor Huerta de Soto set out the key contributions of the Austrian School to economic thought.     

Maximizing political vote in multiple districts

This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts.     

Stable Asymptotics for M‐estimators

We review some first‐order and higher‐order asymptotic techniques for M‐estimators, and we study their stability in the presence of data contaminations. We show that the estimating function (ψ) and its derivative with respect to the parameter play a central role. We discuss in detail the first‐order Gaussian density approximation, saddlepoint density approximation, saddlepoint test, tail area approximation via the Lugannani–Rice formula and empirical saddlepoint density approximation (a technique related to the empirical likelihood method). For all these asymptotics, we show that a bounded ψ (in the Euclidean norm) and a bounded (e.g. in the Frobenius norm) yield stable inference in the presence of data contamination. We motivate and illustrate our findings by theoretical and numerical examples about the benchmark case of one‐dimensional location model.     

Model misspecification,Bayesian versus credibility estimation,and Gibbs posteriors

ABSTRACT

In the context of predicting future claims, a fully Bayesian analysis – one that specifies a statistical model, prior distribution, and updates using Bayes's formula – is often viewed as the gold-standard, while Bühlmann's credibility estimator serves as a simple approximation. But those desirable properties that give the Bayesian solution its elevated status depend critically on the posited model being correctly specified. Here we investigate the asymptotic behavior of Bayesian posterior distributions under a misspecified model, and our conclusion is that misspecification bias generally has damaging effects that can lead to inaccurate inference and prediction. The credibility estimator, on the other hand, is not sensitive at all to model misspecification, giving it an advantage over the Bayesian solution in those practically relevant cases where the model is uncertain. This begs the question: does robustness to model misspecification require that we abandon uncertainty quantification based on a posterior distribution? Our answer to this question is No, and we offer an alternative Gibbs posterior construction. Furthermore, we argue that this Gibbs perspective provides a new characterization of Bühlmann's credibility estimator.     

Productive activities and the wealth of nations: some reasons for Quesnay's failure and Smith's success

The opposition between productive activity (agriculture) and unproductive ones (the others) underlies the Tableau économique. Smith borrows Quesnay's theory of production but deeply transforms it into a distinction between productive and unproductive labour. In any case, it seems quite natural to relate the increase of the wealth of a nation to the relative importance of productive activities vis-à-vis unproductive ones. Quesnay and Smith both share this view. However, if Smith is perfectly right in doing so, Quesnay has failed to prove a definite relation between the fraction of the revenue spent with respect to the productive sector, on the one hand, and the level or growth of the revenue, on the other. Differences in political philosophy may account for this unequal analytical performance.