Overcoming the “Solow paradox”: Tariff reduction and productivity growth of Chinese ICT firms

This paper examines the phenomenon of the “Solow paradox” in China using the Annual Survey of Industrial Production database and the China Customs Records dataset from 1998 to 2007. We find that China likely fell into the Solow paradox in the period 1998–2002, but the total factor productivity of information and communication technology (ICT) enterprises has achieved rapid growth since 2003. Accession to the World Trade Organization is the key reason for China to overcome the Solow paradox, that is, input tariff reduction significantly promoted the productivity of ICT firms. A series of validity and robustness checks confirmed the results. Mechanism analysis shows that input liberalization promotes the productivity of ICT firms through optimizing factor structure, importing more and high-quality inputs, and increasing research and development investment. The conclusions provide strong empirical evidence for developing countries to overcome the Solow paradox through trade liberalization.     

“万村千乡”推广悖论及其解决方案

在农村消费市场存在差异的条件下，全国范围的以行政补贴和市场推广相结合的“万村千乡”推广方式将面临“推广悖论”，即工程的普遍服务职能与企业追求利润的目标之间的冲突，进而可能会造成财政补贴资金的浪费。应在不同区域采用不同的推广策略：发达地区农村，应以企业自主经营为主；具有一定消费市场潜力但企业开拓成本还比较高的地区，应行政补贴和市场推广相结合；尚不具备经营条件的农村地区，应加强基础设施建设，并提高农民收入水平，待时机成熟后再逐步推进。     

钱包赌戏悖论及其行为的经济学意义

本文对行为经济学的一个重要微观模型———钱包赌戏悖论建立了认知分析框架 ,不仅彻底消解了该悖论 ,还发现了与效用和概率均无关的一种新的非理性效应。这一效应既可能导致无帕累托效率的交易陷阱 ,也可能与效用歧化和概率误判等已知的行为经济学效应协同作用 ,产生更复杂的非理性决策。     

新古典经济学假设与组织理论

通过对新古典经济学假设的分析 ,证明组织的充分存在理由 :组织是经济人实现其目标的手段 ,组织理论应该成为新古典经济学假设的前提。首先 ,对新古典经济学假设进行全面分析并找出其不足。其次 ,分析组织存在的意义以及组织理论对新古典经济学假设的支撑和前提作用。     

中国现代化悖论与和谐社会建构

中国现代化悖论是马克思所揭示的资本逻辑在中国现代化中的表现：中国现代化需要利用资本的力量，但由此必然会产生一系列阻碍现代化的因素。这种现代化悖论决定了中国必须在克服矛盾中建构社会主义和谐社会，其基本路径是建立社会主义力量主导的资本形态多样化的市场经济体制，在资本运行和发展的全过程中限制与消灭剥削，实施以人为本的科学发展观，建设现代化的社会主义和谐社会。     

企业成长中的路径依赖与突破

知识是企业能力的基础，它的形成和演变累进性，具有路径依赖特征。本文分析了企业发展中路径依赖现象形成的逻辑，以及它在不确定环境下存在的“成功悖论”。在此基础上，论文提出了路径突破概念，用来描述企业在某一时点上对原有路径的突然改变，并论述了知识创新的两种模式和路径突破的三种机制。     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

Knowledge management through the development of knowledge repositories: towards work degradation

This paper questions the consequences of the use of electronic knowledge repositories for work and employment. Drawing on critical research suggesting that knowledge management associated with such tools presents similarities to scientific management principles, it proposes to examine the following key research question: how do employees experience the transformation of the employment relationship when a knowledge repository is introduced to the workplace? The inquiry is grounded in an exploratory qualitative case study of a knowledge management system designed to foster knowledge‐sharing in a Belgian public administration. The findings illustrate two complementary outcomes: this system resulted in employees experiencing deskilling and work degradation, and was met with resistance. Significantly, this paper considers work degradation as a reflexive phenomenon in the context studied, where knowledge‐sharing systems produced deskilling and resistance as part of a specific re‐regulation process.     

Bilateral redistribution

We explore the implications of three basic and intuitive axioms for income redistribution problems: continuity, no transfer paradox and stability. The combination of the three axioms characterizes in the two-agent case a large family of rules, which we call threshold rules. For each level of total income in society, a threshold is considered for each agent. It is impossible for both agents to be below their respective thresholds. If an agent’s income is below the threshold, the difference is redistributed from the other agent; otherwise, the rule imposes laissez-faire.     

How an international ambidexterity strategy can address the paradox perspective on corporate sustainability: Evidence from Chinese emerging market multinationals

Corporate sustainability (CS) is receiving considerable attention from emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs), playing an important role in the globalized market. However, theoretical and empirical knowledge about how EMNEs address CS is still scant, and the relationship between internationalization and CS has not been widely explored. This study aims to fill this gap, evaluating the relationship between an international ambidexterity strategy and CS in EMNEs, which highlighted the paradox perspective. Then we develop three hypotheses in which we argue how the dynamic capabilities underpinning international ambidexterity could be considered a driver of CS in EMNEs. We test the developed hypotheses against data from 300 Chinese EMNEs obtained by a survey. Our results contribute to shape ambidextrous international strategies and to consider CS as a springboard for the strategic intent to systematically and recursively outperform global competition. Testing a measurement scale of international ambidexterity, we suggest structural ambidexterity as a strategic option of internationalization that allows the achievement of economic, social, and environmental sustainability objectives.