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1.
非政府组织(Non—Government Organizations,缩写为NGO),出现于50年代,兴起于70年代,在过去20年有了飞跃性的发展。如今非政府组织已经渗透到社会生活的方方面面,并且发挥着越来越大的作用。随着世界民主化浪潮波及全球,公民的政治参与成为当代政治生活的重要内容。但是由于种种原因,中国公民的政治参与无论是广度,还是深度都是比较低的,谁能“领导”公民参与政治,非政府组织无疑是最好的领导者!  相似文献   
2.
中国金融抑制问题的政治经济学   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
本文从利益集团理论的视角对中国金融抑制问题给出了一个政治经济学解释,认为中国金融抑制的制度安排内生于给予改革当中利益受损集团金融补贴的需要,为了维护转轨时期的社会稳定,降低改革成本,在财政能力持续下降的情况下,中央政府通过加强对金融体系的控制,以利差租金和货币发行收益为主要路径向国有企业、政府财政提供金融补贴。但近年来,随着居民收入在国民收入分配中所占比例的下降,由金融抑制引发的社会风险的累积、金融效率损失等问题使得中国如果继续维持金融抑制政策将产生巨大的社会成本和效率损失。  相似文献   
3.
从社会网络理论的强弱关系视角对2012-2014年福布斯中国富豪榜的企业家及其企业进行了政治关系的度量,检验了腐败是否会调节政治关系\"力量\"对企业价值的影响。研究发现,企业家本身所具有的政治关系对企业价值具有明显的正向影响作用,关系的\"力量\"越强,对企业价值的正向影响就越大;与此同时,腐败的出现会强化政治关系\"力量\"对民营企业价值的影响。通过分组验证发现,这种\"力量\"在腐败程度较高环境下更易对企业价值产生正向影响,但在腐败程度较低的环境中,政治关系对民营企业价值的影响很多时候并不显著。  相似文献   
4.
This paper examines whether politically connected firms use related party transactions as a tunneling mechanism in Indonesia. We further investigate whether the presence of tunneling compels managers to manage earnings to conceal such expropriation of resources. Our study is motivated by conflicting evidence in the extant literature about the role of political connections and related party transactions. Using data from Indonesia, we document that politically connected firms use related party loans to tunnel resources, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms with government connections. We further document that politically connected firms manage earnings to conceal their tunneling activities. By documenting the role of related party transactions as a specific channel through which connected firms expropriate resources, we enrich the political connection and related party transactions literature.  相似文献   
5.
This paper considers the generalised second-best analytics of optimal restructuring under a political constraint, building on the modelling approach in Dehejia (1997, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1552, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, January 1997). It is shown that the second-best optimum entails administering the terms-of-trade shock fully at the initiation of the reform, just as in shock therapy, but that this must be supplemented with interventions in domestic factor markets. The effects of these interventions are to speed up the exit of the politically affected factor, labour, and to retard the exit of the other factor, capital, both of which serve to prop-up the wages of workers in the declining sector and hence address the political constraint. The results are in the spirit of the neoclassical theory of distortions and welfare: the optimal intervention targets the affected margin directly, in consonance with the ‘targeting’ principle of Bhagwati–Ramaswami–Johnson.  相似文献   
6.
    
This paper examines the relationship between the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture and political instability using a dataset covering around 100 countries. To shed light on the causal effect of culture on political instability, the identification strategy exploits the variation in historical pathogen prevalence and the information provided by the genetic distance between countries. The results reveal that individualism has a negative and statistically significant impact on the degree of political instability, which means that this cultural trait contributes to making the political environment more stable. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of controls that may be correlated with both individualism and political instability, including other cultural dimensions. In fact, the relationship between individualism and political instability does not depend either on the specific measures used to quantify the level of individualism and political instability within the various countries or the estimation strategy adopted. The estimates also show that part of the observed effect of individualism is due to the impact of institutional quality, which acts as a transmission channel linking this cultural trait and political instability.  相似文献   
7.
This paper contributes to the IB literature by investigating MNEs’ risk mitigation strategies in emerging markets. Drawing on institutional perspectives and March’s theoretical concept of forming a ‘political coalition’, we propose that risk mitigation cannot be limited to passive compliance and/or demonstrating good corporate behavior, but should extend to collective efforts by building a political coalition and working with key stakeholders to manage potential risk and obtain favorable outcomes in complex institutional environments. In considering MNEs in contemporary China and India, we offer different types of risk mitigation strategies under various institutional contexts and a framework for future research.  相似文献   
8.
刘哲岩 《魅力中国》2013,(28):35-36
作为世界三大宗教之一的伊斯兰教在埃及具有深厚的群众基础和广泛的精神认同,但是与其他宗教不同的廷伊斯兰载不仅具有广适的精神认同,同时还对世俗生活产生着巨大的影响。在不断的发展过程中,一些伊斯兰教精英分子开始有意识的将伊斯兰教进行政冶伪撩善,特伊新兰教的教义、传统、责任进行重新解释.基于伊斯兰教义提出政治诉求。政治伊斯兰势力应时而生。作为一种政治化了的宗教,其对社会世俗化的影响值得广泛关注。  相似文献   
9.
目前,"思想道德修养与法律基础"课教学实效性比较低的原因是多方面的,其中比较重要的原因是没有搞好与中学政治课教学的衔接,本文诣在探讨搞好"基础"课和中学政治课教学衔接的对策。  相似文献   
10.
    
This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.  相似文献   
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