Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

入世后旅行社人才竞争对策分析

入民后旅行社业遭受的最大冲击将是人才的竞争。本文在分析我国旅行社面对的人才竞争态势基础上，从企业机制变革、转变人才观念、培育激励制度、职业经理人的培养和强化企业品牌等几方面分析了旅行社应对这场人才竞争应采取的对策。     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash

After the crash of 1987, the Nasdaq composite index stayed below the precrash level for nearly two years. Takeover activity surged in this after‐crash period. We compare the motives in the acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during the after‐crash period with those in the ten‐year period before the crash. We find that the announcement period return to acquirers and the proportion of acquirers with positive gains declines in the after‐crash period. For both the periods, agency is the motive for takeovers that have negative total gains (acquirer + target), but synergy and hubris are comotives for takeovers that have positive total gains. The proportion of takeovers in which the managers of acquirers act against the interest of the shareholders increases after the crash.     

论我国现行代理制度的缺陷及完善

代理制度是民商法中一项重要的法律制度,它在现代商品经济中起着不可或缺的作用。过去我国由于商品经济长期不发达,我国的民法,特别是其中的代理制度处于严重的滞后状态,这对我国目前市场经济的发展产生了负面影响。因此,对我国民事代理制度存在的缺陷加以检讨和反思,以期对我国的代理立法和实务有所裨益。     

改革开放以来广州经济增长因素分析

本文从实证角度建立计量模型,利用主成分分析方法和最小二乘回归的方法,对广州改革开放30多年以来的经济增长因素进行了具体分析,研究表明改革开放30多年来,广州经济增长的促进因素主要是劳动力数量的增长,经济制度的变革,产业结构的升级,以及人力资本增长的作用,物质资本不是促进广州经济增长的主要因素。     

浅议管理审计与公司治理

管理审计是公司内部审计的重要组成部分,是一项基于受托管理(经营)责任关系的以审查管理信息为中心任务的证实行为。公司治理是现代公司制的棱心,是以内部监督为挂心的制度安排,包括权力制衡、激励约束及信息反馈等内在机制。管理审计对于公司治理具有极其重要的作用,应充分发挥它的这种作用。