ROSCA的契约治理机制研究

ROSCA契约具有明显的不完备性,其私人治理机制的有效性是ROSCA组织契约不完备性与低违约率并存的原因。     

民间标会融资模式研究

标会模式是民间基于信任建立起来的非正规金融组织，融合了储蓄和融资两种功能，具有一定优势，可作为我国民间金融发展的探索。本文研究结果表明，标会具有独特的运作模式和现金流模型。本文从动态和静态角度估算和分析了标会融资成本，进一步对其内在风险和管控进行研究；在此基础上，本文对标会模式进行改进和设计，对标会的管理提出建议。     

印度对合会的监管立法

合会是印度具有悠久历史的本土化互助合作式资金融通方式,因其对经济发展的促进作用,在印度业已取得半金融系统的重要地位。以法律制度规范合会的运行在印度由来已久,1982年《印度合会法》的颁行更是具有标志性意义。印度对合会的法制监管涵盖着众多方面,包括对合会的界定、合会设立的准入与登记、合会运营的规范化、合会风险的控制、合会当事人的权利义务的合理配置等等,值得我们借鉴。     

On the optimal size of a joint savings association

We develop a formula for the optimal size of a joint savings association between individuals who share the same financial goal and who can save towards that goal at the same rate. Our motivating example and the core of our analysis is a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). We measure the efficiency of a ROSCA by the expected waiting time that it takes a participant to attain his goal when no participant reneges on his commitment to contribute to the common fund, and when each of the participants receives (once) the funds needed to meet his goal. Given this criterion, we define the optimal size of a ROSCA as the number of participants that results in the minimal expected waiting time. We show that an optimal size of a ROSCA exists, that it is limited, and that it is a multiple of the number of time periods that it takes an individual to save on his own. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that when treated as a function of the size of a ROSCA, the expected waiting time is not monotonic when the size builds up from an individual saving on his own to the optimal size. A similar result obtains when we study cases where a ROSCA is enlarged beyond the optimal size. Our findings help explain the limited size as well as other features of ROSCAs observed in developing countries all over the world.     

Exploring retail orientated rotating savings and credit associations: festive season ‘stokvels’ in South Africa

ABSTRACT

Festive season rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or ‘stokvels’ form a large segment of the market in the lower-income bracket and informal market sector in South Africa and have a high collective purchasing power. This study explores the multi-month, multi-phase process through which these stokvels’ evaluate and purchase bulk groceries from retailers at a substantial discount during the festive season. The study followed an exploratory research design through fifteen in-depth interviews of retailers, interviews that were thematically analysed. The findings revealed four phases in festive season stokvel’s buying process, namely: Need Development, Double-Evaluation Loop, List Consolidation, and Post-purchase Behavior. Each phase encapsulated a number of salient interdependent relationships and prominent time periods in which activities occurred over a year through the lens of the participating retailers. While the actual transaction happens in December, the process usually starts before April of that year. The process is modeled to show when certain phases of the process are completed as well as the actors involved (stokvel, retailer, manufacturer/supplier). To date, there has been no research that has examined the buying process of festive season stokvels through the perspective of the retailer. By creating the first map of this commercial and social process, this exploratory research paves the way for further research into the selling and buying processes in these widely used systems of group purchase.     

二元金融体制与农户消费信贷选择——对合会的解释与分析

正规金融失灵为非正规金融的产生和发展提供了制度基础,两者并存的二元化结构是我国农村金融体制的主要特征。本文在Besley模型的基础上引入农户收入不确定性和流动性约束等假设条件,以我国南方农村广泛存在的轮会(合会的一种形式)为例,分析了农户收入不确定的情况下民间合作性金融组织在减少农户为得到耐用消费品的等待时间,扩大当期消费,缓解流动性约束,提高效用水平方面的优势;分析了轮会的违约风险以及相比正规金融的独特优势,得出了轮会和正规金融机构共存时农户消费信贷行为选择的边界。最后,在结论性评述的基础上,本文给出了相关政策建议。     

A Comparison between Formal and Informal Mutual‐credit Arrangements

We analyze under what conditions a group of potential entrepreneurs prefer to form a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), or a mutual‐guarantee association, which we interpret in a rotating scheme and call Rotating Savings and Collateral Association (ROSCoA). We argue that: (1) ROSCAs (ROSCoAs) are likely to be more developed in countries with high (low) bank concentration; (2) the individual flow of savings required to participate in a ROSCoA is generally lower than that needed in a ROSCA; (3) under the assumption that members share their project income at the end of each period, ROSCAs and ROsCoAs are sustainable even without the use of sanctioning mechanisms.