Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.     

Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market

This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum "parity" income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or "buyout"—program in which high-cost producers participate and low-cost producers do not.     

非对称信息下商业银行资本配置研究——基于PCA理论模型分析

资本配置是银行风险管理的核心,是决定银行竞争力的重要因素.经典的资本配置理论均以信息在银行内部各机构完全对称作为基本假设,忽略了总分行问的委托代理关系.鉴于此,本文借鉴PCA模型,在商业银行内部构建一套资本配置的优化机制,以提高银行资本配置的有效性.     

大户与散户在证券市场的博弈

通过对Laffon的模型进行了改进，将散户的效用函数改成了常系数绝对风险厌恶的负指数形式。Laffon的结论为：当θ1,θ2相距不远时，大户与散户都偏好混同均衡。而改进后的模型却找到了θ1,θ2的距离在一个具体的范围内，大户与散户才都偏好混同均衡。     

Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

Measuring the Impact of Asymmetric Information: An Example from Energy Conservation

Asymmetric information has occupied a central role in theoretical microeconomics for almost two decades, but little has been done to ascertain when it matters in practice. The regulatory problem of promoting energy conservation offers an opportunity to ascertain if asymmetric information mattered and to what extent it altered outcomes. Regulators encouraged utilities to promote conservation, and while the regulators could observe conservation prices, they could not observe utilities' promotional efforts. A theoretical model of the regulatory asymmetric information problem yields propositions about the levels of conservation, prices and utility effort, and simulations with realistic parameters are used to determine asymmetric information's impact on these levels.     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

非对称信息条件下代建制的研究

由于代建项目一般工程量大、建设周期长、涉及的关系复杂、隐蔽性较强,很多质量问题在使用过程中逐渐暴露出来,而且在施工过程中项目代建单位比政府投资主管部门对工作及其环境更为了解,因此,政府投资主管部门和项目代建单位在信息占有方面不对称。在这种情况下,有些项目代建单位可能会利用自己的信息优势,通过损害政府投资主管部门的利益来最大化地提高自己的利益,如偷工减料、以次充好、无理索赔等等。在此,文章针对在这种非对称信息条件下如何完善代建制提出一些建议。     

信息不对称、激励与税收征管

税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称造成的影响:其一,造成了纳税人的逆向选择;其二,造成了税制的扭曲;其三,加大了税收的征收成本。应采取有力的政策措施减少纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称。在信息不对称条件下关联博弈和重复博弈可以有效地激励纳税人诚实纳税。