Raising the Bar (3)

This editorial summarizes and comments on the papers published in issue 11(3) so as to raise the bar in applied spatial economic research and highlight new trends. The first paper proposes spatial and a-spatial indicators to describe the networks of airline companies around the world. The second paper sets forth a two-regime gravity-type model with an endogenous threshold parameter to assess the effect of labour market conditions on interregional migration flows. The third paper utilizes micro-data to explain student migration flows to higher education institutions. The fourth paper is among the first to make use of simulation-based location quotients in a multiregional input–output model. Finally, the last paper provides a purely economic–theoretical model on cooperative limit pricing in the context of spatial competition.     

我国刑罚轻缓化的经济分析——兼论罚金刑和自由刑的适用

刑罚轻缓化已经成为刑罚结构改革的总体趋势,通过对刑罚轻缓化的经济分析,我们可以挖掘出刑罚轻缓化背后深层次的原因,那就是＂高概率的惩罚与轻刑化＂的组合是预防和控制犯罪最为经济有效的方式,而轻刑化即我们所谓的刑罚轻缓化。在刑罚轻缓化的背景之下,透视罚金刑与自由刑的适用,我们可以发现罚金刑更符合刑罚轻缓化之意旨,应提升到主刑的地位,未来我国的刑罚结构改革也应以罚金刑为主导,而自由刑只起辅助的作用。     

Predation and accumulation

This article incorporates the economic theory of predation into the theory of economic growth. The analytical framework is a general-equilibrium model of the interaction between two dynasties: a potential predator and its prey. We find that the rate of accumulation of capital and the security of property are positively related only for generations of the prey dynasty that tolerate predation. Generations of the prey dynasty that choose to deter predation, even though their property is perfectly secure, accumulate productive capital more slowly than the preceding generations that tolerated predation.     

Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Summary. We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deterrence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence occurs (Proposition 2). Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: November 21, 1997     

Corruption,market quality,and entry deterrence in emerging economies

In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.     

Member Coordination Costs and Spatial Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Duopsony with a Cooperative

This paper investigates cooperative spatial entry deterrence. To this end, it employs a dynamic game where an investor-owned firm (IOF) competes with a farmers’ processing cooperative which incurs a fixed coordination cost per member. The results indicate that as the value of coordination cost per member increases or the processing margin rises, it becomes more likely for the IOF to use cooperative limit pricing, that is, to deter the cooperative’s market entry. The opposite is true for an increase in the freight rate.     

Trade-offs in the allocation of prosecution resources: an opportunity cost of overcriminalization

One in every five citizens has a criminal record in Korea. Scarce prosecution resources have been severely skewed toward prosecuting more ‘legislated crime’ than ‘conventional crime’. We estimate the opportunity cost of this prosecutory pattern in terms of spillovers to conventional crimes. The cost was found to be substantial. For example, in 2003, the total spillovers accounted for approximately 25% of the increase in conventional crimes for 3 years from 2000 because of the disproportionate prosecutory focus on legislated crimes compared with that of the 1990s. This article has relevance to those countries with an overcriminalizing trend for legislated crimes.     

Deterrence or Conflict Spiral Effect? Exercise of Coercive Power in Marketing Channels: Evidence from China

Purpose: The article aims to test the appropriateness of deterrence and conflict spiral models in marketing channels. Both models have been alternatively used as bases to explain firms’ power-related behaviors in marketing channels. However, the issue of the appropriateness of such an application in various contexts has not yet been addressed.

Methodology/approach: The authors develop the hypotheses based on deterrence theory and their alternatives based on conflict spiral theory. They gather data from 204 sales representatives of suppliers in China and use linear regression analysis to test their hypotheses versus alternatives.

Empirical findings: The data analysis offers supportive evidence for the deterrence logic but with unexpected results. By elaborating on the empirical results, the original assumption of deterrence theory, and the nature of interfirm relationship in marketing channels, the authors modify the deterrence model for research on power related-behaviors in the given context. The analysis implies a possible explanation for inconsistent findings in the literature regarding exercises of coercive power.

Originality/value/contribution: This article proposes a revised deterrence model that can interpret the empirical results with a consistent logic and better predict power-related behaviors in marketing channels.

Research limitations/implications: The research results may lack generalizability with respect to channel type and culture. It does not directly test the cognitive mechanisms that mediate the impact of power on its exercise. Researchers are encouraged to directly test the mediating constructs in other channels or countries.

Practical implications: The article includes some insights and implications for managers in understanding power structure and implementing influence strategies in business-to-business marketing.     

UPSTREAM MARKET FORECLOSURE

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyse two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.     

The Deterrent Effect of Whistleblowing on Tax Collections

Abstract

Many countries use tax-related whistleblowing programs, but the evidence on these programs suggests information provided by whistleblowers yields modest tax collections. However, when every citizen could become a whistleblower, deterrence from tax evasion can by itself increase tax collections. We find that tax collections significantly increased after the introduction of the whistleblowing mechanism in Israel in February 2013, although this mechanism directly yielded little or no tax collections. In support of the hypothesis that deterrence led to the increase in tax collections, we find that collections increased in industries with high tax-evasion risk, but not in industries with low tax-evasion risk. Furthermore, the increase in tax collections occurred in corporations, where the timing and magnitude of tax payments are more discretionary, but not from employees, for whom employers directly deduct taxes. Eventually, following reports that the whistleblowing mechanism is ineffective, deterrence diminished and tax collections decreased, suggesting the deterrence effect was temporary.