Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

基于Bertrand模型的区域港口双寡头定价策略

基于Bertrand模型的数理分析研究了区域港口双寡头的最优定价策略,指出双寡头在定价策略上的合作有利于提高双方的价格和利润。当寡头存在强弱之分时,强势的寡头定价高一些,弱势的寡头定价低一些,在双方价格的纳什均衡点,双方可以获得最大化的均衡利润。并以上海港与宁波-舟山港为案例进行了实证分析。     

The dynamics of innovation and horizontal differentiation

We study innovation in a dynamic stochastic discrete-time duopoly with endogenous horizontal differentiation. Innovation takes the form of a quality ladder; horizontal differentiation is Hotelling competition. We compute Markov-perfect equilibria and study the effects on long-run innovation of changes in taste heterogeneity (transport costs) and firms' costs of relocating products. Innovation rises as the industry's long-run position moves toward products that are permanently co-located in the space of horizontal tastes. A large enough fall in taste heterogeneity will raise long-run innovation, while more costly product relocation lowers innovation if taste heterogeneity is high, and raises it otherwise.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择研究

通过建立模型,并将负的组内网络外部性和正的组间网络外部性引入到模型中,研究双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择。研究结果表明,当消费者给商家带来的正组间网络外部性效应与商家带给消费者的正组间网络外部性效应二者之间的差距足够大时,两个平台均会选择双边市场模式;而当二者之间的差距异常小时,两个平台将选择单边市场模式;但是当二者之间的差距介于中间水平时,其结果就主要取决于平台产品或服务的差异化程度以及商家之间负的组内网络外部性强度。     

Mixed Market Competition in a Quality Differentiated Duopoly Model An Approach to Banking Sector

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks＇ monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

Cooperatives, regulation and competition in Norwegian agriculture

This article analyses the efficiency of current market regulations and market structure in Norwegian agriculture. Based on their potential to coordinate farmers' supplies, large marketing cooperatives are assigned a market regulation role. However, market prices frequently tend to fall below target prices, spurring costly additional market regulations. This is not necessarily a result of inefficient coordination by the cooperative. Using a mixed market model, the study shows that over production may be explained by the competition between marketing cooperatives and investor-owned wholesalers (IOW), typically weakening the cooperatives' ability to coordinate market supply. This conclusion is robust over a variety of IOW contracts. However, to what extent competition is to blame, depends on the target price level and the contract structure of the IOW. Moreover, it is shown that current market interventions to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production.     

混合双寡头模型下的R&D竞争:不确定性和模仿视角

通过引入模仿参数δ来衡量R&D容易被模仿的程度,对Joanna Poya-go-Theotoky(1998)的研究进行了拓展,验证了其基本结论的稳健性。此外,通过引入二次R&D成本函数,研究发现,混合双寡头与私人双寡头情况下的社会福利的比较是不确定的,除了依赖创新规模P以外,还取决于模仿参数d,即——(1)对于任意的d,创新规模越大,私人双寡头越倾向于占优混合双寡头,混合双寡头仅在创新规模较小的时候可能优于私人双寡头;(2)对于创新规模比较小的R&D,只有同时具备较容易的模仿程度,混合双寡头才会优于私人双寡头;(3)在不完全模仿(d≠1)的情况下,在R&D越来越容易被模仿的过程中,利率越高(低),私人双寡头优于混合双寡头的最低P值先上升(下降)后下降(上升)。