Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

中国零售业自营与联营问题的流通经济学分析

零售业自营与联营之争由来已久，在当前供给侧结构性改革、完善促进消费体制机制以及零售业寻求创新发展的背景下，有必要对这一问题展开进一步的理论探讨。文章结合马克思流通经济理论指出，自营和联营的本质区别在于是商业资本还是产业资本承担商品流通职能，自营和联营并不是非此即彼的互斥关系，但如果零售业完全倚重其中一种模式并在全社会推向极端，则需要反思商业资本和产业资本是否各得其所和高效分工。在中国流通体制变革中，虽然联营模式在特定历史时期帮助众多零售企业渡过生存危机并推进内资零售快速扩张，但发展至今，已呈现零售业普遍联营的情况，使零售业整体面临着制约创新发展的新问题。数字经济为零售业回归自营提供了有利契机，零售企业应充分利用新技术摆脱联营制的路径依赖，依托数字化开展深度自营并全面提升流通效率。     

基于Elman神经网络的商业银行信贷风险识别及评估模型

建立了基于Elman神经网络的商业银行信贷风险识别及评估模型，并通过实例验证了模型的准确性和可靠性。研究过程及结果表明，基于Elman神经网络的商业银行信贷风险识别及评估模型能够很好地反映信贷过程中的非线性因素，准确地预测出完整的信贷风险评估指标和信用等级之间的映射关系，能快速评估和有效减低商业的信贷风险。一组实例结果显示该评估模型的准确率接近90％。     

入世后旅行社人才竞争对策分析

入民后旅行社业遭受的最大冲击将是人才的竞争。本文在分析我国旅行社面对的人才竞争态势基础上，从企业机制变革、转变人才观念、培育激励制度、职业经理人的培养和强化企业品牌等几方面分析了旅行社应对这场人才竞争应采取的对策。     

完善农户商事主体制度与发展农村市场

解决“三农”问题的重要途径在于发展农村市场，广大农民是农村市场最重要的主体。然而，农户作为农村集体经济组织的成员——农村承包经营户，依照我国现行《民法通则》、《农村土地承包法》等规定，是一种民事法律关系的主体，享有民事权利和承担民事义务。在我国市场经济条件下的商事法律中，关于农民、农户在农村市场的商事经营主体资格的制度设计比较缺乏，从而在一定程度上制约了农民的市场行为。为了充分调动广大农民积极性，更好地建设和发展农村市场，有必要完善农户商事经营主体资格的法律制度。     

商业银行成本控制方略

加入世贸组织后 ,我国商业银行将面临更加严峻的竞争环境。成本控制在商业银行经营管理中将发挥着越来越重要的作用。因此 ,有必要研究商业银行的成本控制方略     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash

After the crash of 1987, the Nasdaq composite index stayed below the precrash level for nearly two years. Takeover activity surged in this after‐crash period. We compare the motives in the acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during the after‐crash period with those in the ten‐year period before the crash. We find that the announcement period return to acquirers and the proportion of acquirers with positive gains declines in the after‐crash period. For both the periods, agency is the motive for takeovers that have negative total gains (acquirer + target), but synergy and hubris are comotives for takeovers that have positive total gains. The proportion of takeovers in which the managers of acquirers act against the interest of the shareholders increases after the crash.