Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

An algebraic theory of portfolio allocation

Summary. Using group and majorization theory, we explore what can be established about allocation of funds among assets when asymmetries in the returns vector are carefully controlled. The key insight is that preferences over allocations can be partially ordered via majorized convex hulls that have been generated by a permutation group. Group transitivity suffices to ensure complete portfolio diversification. Point-wise stabilizer subgroups admit sectoral separability in fund allocations. We also bound the admissible allocation vector by a set of linear constraints the coefficients of which are determined by group operations on location and scale asymmetries in the rate of returns vector. For a distribution that is symmetric under a reflection group, the linear constraints may be further strengthened whenever there exists an hyperplane that separates convex sets. Received: May 15, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Journal paper No. J-19797 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 3463, and supported by Hatch Act and State of Iowa funds. Correspondence to: D. A. Hennessy     

构建和谐社会利益均衡机制的思路与对策——以广州市为例

构建利益均衡机制,减缓利益冲突,是建设和谐社会最根本的途径之一。广州市利益不均衡的表现具有代表性,其强势群体利益扩张的负面影响有所增加,弱势群体的利益格局不容乐观,且利益群体间的收入差距进一步扩大。导致利益不均衡的原因和背景十分复杂,构建利益均衡机制的体制环境、效率重于公平的经济环境、强势利益群体的约束机制以及弱势群体自身的获利能力在短期内都难以改变。当前应全面探索建立相对合理的收入分配机制、财政增收后的反哺机制、外来工的补偿机制与保障机制、低收入阶层的保护机制和提升机制、中等收入阶层扩大机制以及弱势群体权益保护机制,以构建和谐社会的利益均衡机制。     

健美操教学中合作学习法的应用

在健美操教学过程中,采用固定学习小组的形式进行合作学习,有利于促进人际交流,培养集体意识和竞争精神,不仅活跃课堂气氛,更能激发学生的学习热情,从而提高学习效果。     

金融控股集团的内部风险控制

内部风险控制的有效性直接关系着金融控股集团发展的成败.要想有效控制金融控股集团的内部风险,需要设立专门的风险监控组织体系,建立审计稽核管理体制,建立集团内部风险预警系统和风险监控制度.     

银行财务管理目标模式研究

随着金融市场的逐步对外开放，我国商业银行的管理活动也必须走与国际接轨之路。本文分析了目前流行的主要的财务管理目标，即利润最大化、股东财富最大化、企业价值最大化及相关利益者最大化，研究了其优缺点。在此基础上，提出了我国商业银行财务管理的目标应是相关利益者最大化。     

产业集群优势下优势企业的打造

充分发挥区域经济优势和产业集群优势 ,打造优势企业和产品的“世界工厂” ,政府应加强政策引导 ,转变自身的职能 ,企业要创新产权制度 ,加大技术研发 ,积极吸纳先进的管理经验 ,形成政府和企业的合力。     

企业集团适时财务控制体系的研究与设计

为加强企业集团财务控制力度,提高企业集团整体竞争力,企业集团应充分利用网络资源,以网络技术为依托,构建以全面预算管理为框架、资金管理为核心、财务信息控制为保障的适时财务控制体系。     

企业集团财务的分层分权管理

企业集团是在集团公司主导下组建的法人联合体,集团公司要借助于企业集团这一组织平台来协调、统一集团所属成员企业的生产经营及财务政策。企业集团应当依据章程规范及组织机构进行逐级授权,对集团财务进行分层分权管理。集团公司既是集团财务的一个管理层次、又是集团主要成员企业母公司的双重身份,决定了其在企业集团财务中具有无可替代的核心管理地位。