收购兼并在上市公司发展战略中的地位和实施策略

本文主要阐述了以下三个方面的问题：（1）公司为何及时从事购并交易；（2）如何使购并活动获得成功；（3）制定中国进行购并行动的战略。     

企业并购活动中目标企业选择的层次分析评估研究

企业并购是企业进行资本扩张、促进企业间存量资源合理统流动的重要途径。对企业并购中的目标企企的选择、价值评估进行研究，构建我国企业并前过程中目标企业选择的评价指标体系，运用AHP法对目标企业选择进行定量化评估，将有利于企业通过并购后，实现资源的最优配置．保证企业经营机制协调、有效地运行。     

中国移动（香港）并购融资安排及其启示

并购活动需要大量资金支持,融资难已成为制约大规模战略并购的瓶颈之一.本文基于并购融资安排理论,通过对中国移动(香港)有限公司一系列并购融资安排的详细描述、统计、分析,揭示了中国移动(香港)并购融资的一些规律,从而说明企业应根据自身实际情况选择不同的并购融资安排,这对我国上市公司并购活动的融资安排具有重要的借鉴意义.     

中国商业银行跨业兼营财险和基金之模拟分析

通过使用模拟合并的方法分析中国商业银行跨业兼营财险和基金的潜在风险和收益,研究结果表明商业银行跨业兼营财险和基金能增加银行的收益,并提高单位风险的报酬,同时能显著降低商业银行的破产概率;研究结果同时显示,合适的财险和基金业务资产比重对于达到最佳的跨业兼营效果是必不可少的.此外,对比研究发现商业银行同时跨业兼营财险和基金比商业银行单一跨业兼营财险或者基金能获得更大的风险分散收益,因此支持银行同时跨业兼营财险和基金.     

阿里巴巴并购饿了么的动因和财务风险分析

在经济全球化的背景下,为扩大企业经营规模,并购成为企业很好的选择。论文以阿里巴巴收购饿了么为例,研究阿里巴巴收购饿了么的动因,分析并购为阿里巴巴这个典型的互联网企业带来的财务风险,并为互联网企业的并购提供宝贵的建议。     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

Stated Preferences, Real Behaviour and Anchoring: Some Empirical Evidence

We compare different contingent valuation question formats with each other and with observed behaviour for a non-monetary estimation task, the expected number of kilometers travelled by automobile. Open-ended questions, open-ended follow-up questions, dichotomous choice (DC) questions, and double-bound DC questions are included. The single and double-bound DC questions result in an estimated mean about twice as high as the actual value and the open-ended mean. The DC question overestimation seems to be due to an anchoring effect leading to yea-saying behaviour. Our results about the difference between DC questions and open-ended questions is consistent with the pattern observed in contingent valuations studies of the willingness to pay. Our results indicates that DC questions seem to be associated with a general overestimation problem that is present even for simple non-monetary estimation tasks.     

论我国企业合并的反垄断控制

过度的企业合并会限制甚至消灭市场竞争,因此,保持市场的有效竞争需要反垄断立法。反垄断法合并控制应关注整 体经济效率;合并控制的实质性标准是产生或加强市场支配地位;而符合反垄断禁止标准同时又存在法定豁免事由的的合并有 可能会被批准