R&D Investments and Tax Incentives: The Role of Intra-Firm Cross-Border Collaboration*

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.     

防范合谋的激励机制研究综述

通过对合谋内涵、舍谋成因以及防范合谋的激励机制设计三个方面的国内外主要文献进行的回顾与述评结果发现，我国在防范合谋的激励机制设计方面主要存在下列问题：国内许多文献认为信息不对称是合谋的成因，但实际上合谋的成因是互惠，信息不对称只是为合谋提供了条件；现有理论主要从激励经济学角度研究防范合谋的机制设计的，但人类行为动机的产生和发展、变化是一个复杂、微妙的心理过程，仅从激励角度研究合谋问题不足以取得满意的效果。     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.     

国有经济结构分析与调整对策

国有经济战略调整是中央提出的国有企业改革和发展的重要目标。在计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨过程中，国有经济的分布仍不够合理，国有企业在竞争领域仍然占有很大的比重，在经济结构的优化方面仍然存在着一些不容忽视的问题。因此，对这一问题的深入研究，具有重要意义。     

公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

基于混合激励机制的两层供应链产品开发合作博弈分析

针对供应商与制造商在产品开发合作中潜在的风险,建立了动态合作博弈模型,通过对正负激励策略的比较分析,得出两种激励策略按照一定结构混合运用能有效地发挥负激励降低合作风险、正激励增加合作收益的作用的结论。     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Modelling soccer matches using bivariate discrete distributions with general dependence structure

In this paper copulas are used to generate bivariate discrete distributions. These distributions are fitted to soccer data from the English Premier League. An interesting aspect of these data is that the primary variable of interest, the discrete pair shots-for and shots-against, exhibits negative dependence; thus, in particular, we apply bivariate Poisson-related distributions that allow such dependence. The paper focuses on Archimedian copulas, for which the dependence structure is fully determined by a one-dimensional projection that is invariant under marginal transformations. Diagnostic plots for copula fit based on this projection are adapted to deal with discrete variables. Covariates relating to within-match contributions such as numbers of passes and tackles are introduced to explain variability in shot outcomes. The results of this analysis would appear to support the notion that playing the 'beautiful game' is an effective strategy—more passes and crosses contribute to more effective play and more shots on the goal.