The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

(In)equality and the South African Constitution

ABSTRACT

Does the South African Constitution constrain or empower government, courts and citizens in addressing systemic social and economic inequalities? This article argues that the Constitution is explicitly ‘transformative’, but is an enabling document, providing ‘scaffolding’ for political and legal activities. It is government, strong institutions and civil society that are ultimately responsible for securing its equality aspirations. Here the Constitution admits of different understandings of equality and different economic and social policy choices. This article identifies these contested meanings of equality and suggests that a liberal egalitarian/social democratic version is dominant in policy choices and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. It illustrates this with reference to the Court’s jurisprudence on equality, and suggests that more radical and transformative interpretations remain possible. However, it concludes that we cannot escape politics, the need for good policy choices and effective implementation and enforcement.     

信息技术提高企业组织敏捷性的作用机理

从考察企业组织的敏捷性与交易成本的相互关系入手,对企业组织敏捷性的影响因素进行了剖析。详细分析了信息技术(IT)对提高企业组织敏捷性的作用机理。指出IT正是通过降低企业内、外部的交易成本、缩短流程时间、提高人的认识理性、扼制机会主义、促进企业组织结构、决策方式     

浅析公共服务有效供给的新模式

通过对公共服务的属性分析，结合新政治经济学理论和政府失败的现实因素，探索公益物品的有效供给模式，提出了公共服务的签约转包机制，并分析了这一机制的不足和政府的作用。     

完善欠发达地区在区域不平衡发展中的促动机制

区域不平衡发展是一个普遍的规律,欠发达地区应根据不平衡发展理论,吸取经验教训,建立科学的不平衡发展促动机制。     

工程投标报价的优化

在报价低者为优的评标规则下，报价、中标可得利润与中标概率总是成反比，最优报价为中标可得利润与中标概率的乘积最大时所对应的报价。结合案例详细分析了只有一个具体竞争对手，有若干具体竞争对手，已知对手数目但不知具体对象，既不知对手数目也不知具体对象四种情况下的报价决策方法。     

以风险协议为框架的化工措施管理机制探索与实践

以西方经济学中的代理理论为基础．建立了一套以风险协议为框架、对化工措施全过程进行控制的管理机制和相应的保证体系，提高了化工措施现场实施的成功率和有效率。     

基于高校教师职业特点的激励机制探析

在对高校教师激励机制现状分析之后,针对高校教师的职业特点,提出了高校教师激励机制模式:薪酬激励、社会保障计划、参与激励、竞争激励、组织文化激励、工作激励。     

国债规模的均衡数量及优化

笔者基于世代交叠模型,假定政府执行赤字预算体制,在市场结清的均衡状态下得到了确定国债规模与私人资本规模之比值的解析式。通过模拟发现税率、基本财政支出率、产出关于私人资本的弹性等是决定该比值大小的主要因素。     

防范合谋的激励机制研究综述

通过对合谋内涵、舍谋成因以及防范合谋的激励机制设计三个方面的国内外主要文献进行的回顾与述评结果发现，我国在防范合谋的激励机制设计方面主要存在下列问题：国内许多文献认为信息不对称是合谋的成因，但实际上合谋的成因是互惠，信息不对称只是为合谋提供了条件；现有理论主要从激励经济学角度研究防范合谋的机制设计的，但人类行为动机的产生和发展、变化是一个复杂、微妙的心理过程，仅从激励角度研究合谋问题不足以取得满意的效果。