Dynamic response of bank-intermediated trade finance to a global liquidity shock

This paper investigates the bank-level responses of a bank-intermediated instrument of trade finance to a negative global liquidity shock in Korea. Using a factor-augmented vector autoregression approach, the results show that there exists significant heterogeneity in bank-level trade-finance responses to a global liquidity shock. In addition, we find that the source of the heterogeneity is the bank-level foreign currency liquidity condition; banks with a better foreign currency liquidity condition may dampen the negative impact of a global liquidity shock on trade-finance.     

我国股市与货币需求的相互影响分析及政策涵义

运用协整、弱外生性和因果关系检验对我国股票市场与货币需求的关系进行的实证研究发现,股市不影响M2的总量但影响其结构;M1对股市不产生直接影响,而M2对股市的直接影响处于有与无的临界状态;M1、M2均通过GDP对股市产生间接影响,但没有形成利率传导机制,我国股市是关于协整向量的弱外生变量.基于以上结论提出了相应的政策建议.     

A multilateral approach to examining the comovements among major world equity markets

This study investigates the comovement in stock indices among major developed markets, where Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices are employed for the purposes of the study. We employ a model that accommodates multilateral international impacts on equity index movements. The empirical results reveal the existence of significant international transmission effects among these major world markets, both in terms of returns and volatility, and mostly in a positive direction. The U.S. market, as expected, is the leading market in the sense that it has the most pervasive and significant impact on all markets across continents. However, the U.S. market exhibits a different relationship with European markets from that with Asia-Pacific markets. The evidence also suggests that strong regional transmission effects exist. A further investigation using the extended model reveals that the linkages between U.S. and European markets are driven by positive global common forces and by negative international competitive effects. On the other hand, the U.S. and Asian markets are linked through positive global common forces and positive international contagion effects. The United States, Canada, and the U.K. are the three markets that still demonstrate contagion influence over countries outside its own region. The Asia-Pacific markets are more susceptible to contagion effects. Finally, it is interesting to find that Japanese market performance became more contagious toward other markets during the Asian financial crisis period.     

The Effects of Productivity Shocks,Financial Shocks,and Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates: An Application of the Currency Crisis Model and Implications for Emerging Market Crises

What kind of shock affects exchange rate dynamics? How much of an effect does the monetary policy have on exchange rates? To answer these questions empirically based on the currency crisis model, I use panel data on 51 emerging countries from 1980 to 2011, identify shocks, and apply instrumental variable methods. I found that both productivity shocks and shocks to a country’s risk premium affect exchange rates and a 1 percentage point increase in the policy interest rate is associated with a 1 percentage point appreciation of domestic currency. I further apply this method to Asian and Latin-American crises.     

The effects of capacity reduction policy under the interest rate peg in China

Capacity reduction has been a recurrent theme in China's economic policy. The central government takes various administrative measures to remove excess capacity, accumulated mainly due to underpriced production factors and distorted incentives. I evaluate the de-capacity policy in a series of models and prove that its effects depend critically on its persistence and monetary policy regime. Under an interest rate peg, a transient policy that changes markup temporarily is ineffective and even expansionary, whereas a persistent policy is effective due to a negative wealth effect. A permanent de-capacity policy can lead to over-reactions in macro variables because the interest rate peg adds positive feedback to the economy. Therefore, the de-capacity policy has greater uncertainty under the interest rate peg. As a policy tool, it easily deviates from its target and brings about excessive volatility. However, long-run price stability and a gradually advanced de-capacity policy are conducive to the achievement of policy targets.     

Sources of business fluctuations: Financial or technology shocks?

Despite the widespread belief that technology shocks are the main source of business fluctuations, recent empirical studies indicate that in the absence of financial frictions, a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment is the main source and is closely related to financial conditions for investment. We incorporate a financial accelerator mechanism and two types of financial shocks to the external finance premium and net worth in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment, the investment-good price markup, and the rates of neutral and investment-specific technological changes. This model is estimated using eleven US time series that include data on loan, net worth, the loan rate, and the relative price of investment. Our estimation results show that the (non-stationary) neutral and investment-specific technology shocks primarily drive output and investment fluctuations, while the external finance premium shock plays an important role for investment fluctuations. This financial shock induced substantial falls and subsequent sharp hikes in the external finance premium and caused boom–bust cycles over the past two decades.     

Systemic risk and dynamics of contagion: a duplex inter-bank network

This paper constructs a duplex banking network formed by credit relationships and information interaction via the banks’ balance sheet to model the structure of systemic risk and investigate the dynamic mechanism of contagion in terms of default and liquidity infection along with the factors that affect the extent of the contagion. We systematically explain the role that duplex banking networks play in different aspects of risk contagion. Through theoretical analysis and simulations, we conclude that asymmetric information interaction would increase the inflexibility of the system, which leads to liquidity shortage and possibly the collapse of the whole market. The weakness of systemic risk in the interior of the complex banking system can be characterized by the partial discount factor using illiquid assets in the information network. By improving the connectedness of the information network of the duplex networks, the spread of contagion can be partially slowed.     

Growth and real business cycles in Vietnam and the Asean-5. Does the trend shock matter?

We examine Vietnam’s economy in comparison with its closest trade partners. We show that capital accumulation has been the primary growth engine since the start of its transition to the pro-market economy in 1986 – the Doi Moi. We also show that the cyclical behavior of its macro aggregates is similar to that of its ASEAN-5 peers and other developing countries. We extend the standard small open economy RBC model by considering habit persistence and government consumption, which allows a close match of the moments of the growth variables. At the business cycle frequency, transitory productivity shocks account for approximately one-half of Vietnam’s output variance, while country risk and non-transitory productivity shocks account to close to one-fifth each. Regarding the Solow residual’s volatility, we find that the trend component merely accounts for 12 % of this variance in Vietnam, while in Thailand it is only 6 %. These findings refute the “the cycle is the trend” hypothesis in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and align with the hypotheses in García-Cicco et al. (2010) and Rhee (2017), where the stationary component is overwhelmingly dominant. We claim that technological progress and productivity-enhancing measures are fundamental for Vietnam’s economy to sustain high growth.     

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on business expectations

We document and evaluate how businesses are reacting to the COVID-19 crisis through August 2020. First, on net, firms see the shock (thus far) largely as a demand rather than supply shock. A greater share of firms report significant or severe disruptions to sales activity than to supply chains. We compare these measures of disruption to their expected changes in selling prices and find that, even for firms that report supply chain disruptions, they expect to lower near-term selling prices on average. We also show that firms are engaging in wage cuts and expect to trim wages further before the end of 2020. These cuts stem from firms that have been disproportionally negatively impacted by the pandemic. Second, firms (like professional forecasters) have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by lowering their one-year-ahead inflation expectations. These responses stand in stark contrast to that of household inflation expectations (as measured by the University of Michigan or the New York Fed). Indeed, firms’ one-year-ahead inflation expectations fell precipitously (to a series low) following the onset of the pandemic, while household measures of inflation expectations jumped markedly. Third, despite the dramatic decline in firms’ near-term inflation expectations, their longer-run inflation expectations have remained relatively stable.