Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.     

Information Flows across Markets: Evidence from China–Backed Stocks Dual–Listed in Hong Kong and New York

Using a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, we examine patterns of information flows for China–backed stocks that are cross–listed on exchanges in Hong Kong and New York. Results analyzing the dual–listed stocks indicate significant mutual feedback of information between domestic (Hong Kong) and offshore (New York) markets in terms of pricing and volatility. Stocks listed on the domestic market appear to play a more significant role of information transmission in the pricing process, whereas stocks listed on the offshore market play a bigger role in volatility spillover.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

The impact on stock prices of deferral and elimination of internal control audit requirement for small firms

This paper examines the cumulative market reaction to the events related to deferral of internal control audit requirement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its elimination under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 for nonaccelerated filers (small firms). We document that small firms experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns around these events; and the differences between the cumulative abnormal returns for small firms and the two control groups (accelerated and large accelerated filers) were negative and significant at the 1% level. These results support the notion that market participants value the reliability of financial information irrespective of the firm size. Within the small firms, we find no firm characteristic significantly explains the market reaction to the events considered. That is, all small firms lost market value in reaction to the events that delayed and eliminated their internal control audit requirement.     

Simple and Painless? The Limitations of Spillover in Environmental Campaigning

The comfortable perception that global environmental challenges can be met through marginal lifestyle changes no longer bears scrutiny. The cumulative impact of large numbers of individuals making marginal improvements in their environmental impact will be a marginal collective improvement in environmental impact. Yet, we live at a time when we need urgent and ambitious changes. An appeal to environmental imperatives is more likely to lead to spillover into other pro-environmental behaviours than an appeal to financial self-interest or social status.

会计信息失真的博弈分析

会计信息失真是长期困扰会计工作的顽症 ,也是导致国家宏观经济决策和企业内外微观决策失误的祸根。采用博弈论的分析方法对会计信息失真产生的条件、机制以及治理的有效方法进行了深层次的探讨 ,并指出要提高会计数据的质量 ,以确保会计信息的真实性 ,就必须要建立完善的监督体系 ,严格监督 ,并加大执法力度 ,对作假者进行严惩 ,同时又不能使监督和惩罚的成本过高。     

我国政府环境信息公开的立法创新与反思

通过法律规范政府环境信息公开是我国环境法领域和行政法领域共同关注的问题。《政府信息公开条例》和《环境信息公开办法（试行）》已对我国政府环境信息公开进行了许多立法创新,但也存在一些值得我们反思的问题,如公开的主体范围拓展不够、公开的内容微观不足、救济制度有待完善、问责制度应当健全。     

环境会计信息供求双方的博弈分析

在构建我国环境会计信息披露体系的过程中,我们通常以国家宏观利益为研究导向,忽视信息供求双方的微观利益及其内部效用;以外在制约为主要手段,缺乏内在激励。我国环境信息披露目标难以达成的症结之一在于信息供求双方的内部效用无法满足而造成的披露动力不足。文章以信息供求双方内部效用为逻辑起点进行博弈分析,提出从短期和长期两方面激励企业环境披露信息的建议。