以德报怨策略与企业机会主义行为:基于高新技术企业的研究

基于自我执行协议理论及交易属性,集中探讨企业采取以德报怨策略应对合作者剥削行为的驱动因素以及企业以德报怨策略如何影响合作者机会主义行为。通过对173个中国高新技术企业买方数据问卷调查,采用PLS对假设进行检验。结果显示,交易属性中的交易可观察性是以德报怨策略的前因变量,并且受交易复杂性的影响。同时,以德报怨策略能够减少交易双方的机会主义行为。     

Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences.     

Observability and Subjective Performance Measurement

Accounting research provides theory and evidence on the choice and use of subjective performance measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, accounting research does not focus on the subjective performance measurement of managerial behaviour once measures have been chosen. We extend accounting research by investigating the factors that influence the subjective performance measurement decision. We predict that the level of subjective performance measurement is influenced by the informativeness of financial performance measures and by the verifiability of the nonfinancial measures in a formula‐based incentive plan. We expect that the measures' informativeness and verifiability depends on the observability of both the managerial behaviour being subjectively measured and the reliability of the financial and nonfinancial performance measures. More specifically, we hypothesize that the influence of the levels of the financial performance measures on the level of subjective performance measurement is moderated by the observability of either the managerial behaviour being measured (for the financial measures) or the performance measures' reliability (for the nonfinancial measures). Data from a firm provide support for our hypotheses.     

When more pain is better: Role of need for uniqueness in service evaluations of observable service recovery

Service encounters may occur at public settings, providing an opportunity for other customers to observe a target customer’s experience, which, per se, may exert some social pressure on the target customer. However, this research argues that for some customers the observability of their encounters is an opportunity to satisfy their social needs. In particular, this research investigates the impact of consumer need for uniqueness on service evaluations of observable versus unobservable recovery encounters. Across three experimental studies, this research finds that following observable recovery encounters, consumer need for uniqueness enhances service evaluations. Findings also indicate that customers who appreciate uniqueness have similar reactions to an elaborate apology and high compensation. The results indicate that the observability of recovery efforts leads to lower perceived severity among customers high in need for uniqueness and thereby enhances their service evaluations. This research concludes with contributions, implications, limitations, and future research.     

无源双基地雷达目标运动分析的可观测性

本文研究利用外辐射源的单站无源定位和跟踪技术的可观测性问题。引入相容目标轨迹的概念，分析了三维N阶运动目标在不同观测信息条件下的相容轨迹的几何分布，并证明多普勒和到达时差观测是等价观测量。     

Adverse selection when loss severities differ: First-best and costly equilibria

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained.