宁安“渤海国”旅游景区可持续发展策略分析

宁安市“渤海国”旅游景区经过十余年的发展对推动当地经济与文化的发展起到了重要作用。然而，从可持续发展角度来看，景区在其发展过程中仍存在着市场适应性不强、利益群体间关系无法理顺以及游客体验质量无法保障等问题。在市场经济体制下，景区只有转变管理模式、重新整合旅游资源、科学评价各利益群体间的价值创造关系，才能逐步确立竞争优势力量，参与到国内、国际旅游市场竞争中来。     

Unfolding China’s state-owned corporate empires and mitigating agency hazards: Effects of foreign investments and innovativeness

Integrating agency and institutional perspectives, we describe how China’s socio-political institutions create state-owned corporate empires with unique agency conflicts. We develop a framework demonstrating how economically unjustified firm expansion, i.e. empire building, mediates the relationship between state ownership and performance. We uncover the instrument in empire building and appropriate corporate governance and strategic management remedies. An empirical study on 29,638 Chinese firms evidences that (1) increased state ownership drives higher management expenses and lower firm profitability though empire building; (2) long-term debt is used to finance empire building; and (3) foreign capital investments and innovativeness can mitigate these agency conflicts.     

Islamic Economics in the Late Ottoman Empire: Menâpirzâde Nuri Bey's Mebâhis-i İlm-i Servet

The existing literature on Islamic economics suggests that Islamic economics is a twentieth-century phenomenon with its roots in medieval Islamic intellectual and theological history, thereby leaving a centuries-long gap in the history of Islamic economic thinking. This study aims at taking a first step towards filling this gap by examining a nineteenth-century example of Islamic economics in late Ottoman economic literature. Suggesting a broader definition of Islamic economics, this article investigates a prominent Ottoman intellectual's efforts to define, reveal, and revive a tradition of Islamic economics in historical and intellectual context.     

Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective

In this paper, we seek to identify causes of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We note that great salience was attached to issues of self-governance and autonomy of the numerous ethnic groups living within the Empire. From a public choice perspective, the Empire was an over-centralised state and there were clear gains from federalising it. However, such federalisation was not feasible because of the collective action problem arising in bargaining with the central government. Furthermore, the move towards the war economy and the empowerment of the executive state provided the last drop leading to the exit of ethnic minorities from the monarchy and to the ultimate demise of the Empire.

Income Level and Income Inequality in the Euro‐Mediterranean Region,C. 14–700

Was the Euro‐Mediterranean region at the time of the Roman Empire and its Western successor states more unequal than the European Union today? We use some scant evidence on personal income distribution within the Empire and differences in average regional incomes to conclude that the Empire was more homogeneous, in terms of regional incomes, than today's EU, and inter‐personal inequality was low. Moreover, income inequality was likely less around year 700 than in Augustus's time. The latter finding contrasts with a view of rising inequality as the Western Roman Empire dissolved.     

Regime change and debt default: the case of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman empire following World War One

We consider the effect of the three largest regime changes following World War One on the foreign debt repayments of the succeeding regimes. The Bolsheviks repudiated the Tsarist debt, both external and internal in early 1918, and could not borrow internationally until the 1970s. The Austro-Hungarian successor states, with the exception of Romania, remained on good terms with lenders, and quickly gained access to foreign capital. However, the Ottoman successor states entered into protracted negotiations before accepting responsibility for a share of the debt, which meant they faced a lengthy delay before being able to re-enter the international capital market. We analyze these events using a game theoretical model of incomplete information, whereby capital markets can not directly observe a government’s ‘type.’ We find that there were two main economic reasons why countries did not settle their debts after their regimes changed. Some countries, in particular Russia, did not value continued credit market access as highly as before, and second that international lenders will not trust a regime in default with a new loan.     

The emergence of English commercial law: Analysis inspired by the Ottoman experience

Thirteenth-century England was a commercial backwater whose trade was dominated by foreigners. To accommodate and encourage foreign merchants, England modified its legal system by creating legal institutions that were available to both domestic and foreign traders. Among the most important of these institutions were streamlined debt collection procedures and mixed juries composed of both Englishmen and foreigners. By introducing institutions that treated locals and foreigners equally, England created a level playing field that enabled English merchants to become increasingly prominent in the later Middle Ages. England's ability to modernize its law was facilitated by the secular nature of English law, the representation of merchants in Parliament, and legal pluralism. Medieval England contrasts sharply with the early modern Ottoman Empire. The latter created special institutions for foreign merchants, which eventually put Ottoman Muslims at a competitive disadvantage.     

移风易俗对秦文化变革的影响

秦人历史上曾发生过两次大规模的移风易俗运动：商鞅变法和秦始皇“匡饬异俗”。前者是以知识精英为主体自上而下的改革,产生了以“功利”“尚武”为主要内容的新时代精神,大大优化了秦文化,对秦国强盛,“横扫六合”,最后统一中国起了决定性作用;但后者即秦统一后秦始皇的“匡饬异俗”,由于秦始皇面临着更复杂的形势：六国鄙视与抵抗,部分知识精英由君主的同盟者变为敌对者,分化瓦解了文化改造运动阵营的力量,因此,其远没有达到预期的目标,且因此加速了秦帝国的灭亡。     

Inflation Dynamics and its Sources in the Ottoman Empire: 1586–1913

This study examines the dynamics and determinants of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 1586–1913 period. There are two possible reasons for inflation: fiscal expansion and monetary expansion, which could be generated through the debasement of local currency (Akçe). We used a set of political and structural variables in order to explain the change in inflation dynamics. In particular, we considered the war years, periods of Ottoman history that show different characteristics (the slow‐down period, the recession period and the break‐up period) and the period of constitutional monarchy. Moreover, we tested whether the inflation process was the same for each sultan and whether each sultan’s behavior during the first year was different from the rest of his reign. The empirical evidence reported here suggests that war accelerated inflation as expected and fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the main reason for inflation. Moreover, the slow‐down, the recession and the break‐up periods affected inflation positively; both fiscal expansion and the debasement of the Akçe were seen in these three periods as sources of inflation. While employing different inflationary policies during his reign, each sultan accelerated inflation in the first year of his reign by the debasement of the Akçe or by fiscal expansion. Last, the constitutional monarchy period had a significant positive effect on inflation although fiscal expansion, rather than the debasement of the Akçe, was the source of inflation during this period.     

WAS THERE A GUARANTEE EFFECT FOR THE OTTOMAN LOANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY?

This study analyses the effect of formal guarantees of the British government on the performance of Turkish bonds issued in the second half of the nineteenth century. We compare the yields and prices of 11 bonds issued by the Ottoman government with different guarantees attached to each bond. Our findings indicate that the formal guarantee of the British government was significant in determining the prices and yields of Ottoman bonds. Even though the British guarantee had no effect on Ottoman institutions, practices, and fiscal fundamentals, the yields on the guaranteed loan did not move together with other Ottoman loans.