Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inequality and entrepreneurial thresholds

We explore the relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on cross-sectional data from a largescale survey of the economic conditions of individuals across India, we develop a number of dimensions of inequality to explore empirically how inequality interacts with entrepreneurship, operationalized as self-employment or as employing other people. We find compelling evidence that there are thresholds to becoming self-employed, and even more so to assembling the combinations of resources and personal attributes required to become an employer. Greater inequality leaves more people unable to make the transition to self-employment, leaving casual laboring as the occupation of necessity. At the same time, inequality increases the number of employers in a society, by concentrating resources - particularly land and finance - enough for significant numbers of people to be able to cross this higher threshold. Lastly, greater differentiation into social or religious groups curtails the ability to cross either entrepreneurial threshold, presumably by limiting the extent and benefits of social networks of value for entrepreneurship.     

Prácticas de compra predatorias en las cadenas mundiales de suministro de la industria de la confección: tensión en las relaciones laborales en la India

Desde hace tiempo se viene documentando en múltiples estudios la vulneración de los derechos de los trabajadores en las cadenas mundiales de suministro de la industria de la confección; sin embargo, se ha prestado menos atención al reciente empeoramiento de algunos déficits de trabajo decente y sus causas, que el presente artículo asocia a las prácticas de compra predatorias derivadas de las crecientes asimetrías de poder. Estas prácticas, ilustradas aquí a través de las empresas indias del sector del vestido orientadas a la exportación, ejercen presiones salariales a la baja y favorecen la proliferación de formas atípicas de empleo y la banalización de la violencia física y verbal contra los trabajadores, al tiempo que aumentan las exigencias de productividad. Para frenar esta evolución, es necesario establecer mecanismos de fijación de precios que tengan en cuenta el costo que entraña el cumplimiento del principio del trabajo decente, adoptar una reglamentación estatal adecuada y contar con la participación de los trabajadores.     

How novel actors achieve a positive reputation: A case of prep schools with elite‐level hockey programs

How are novel organizations able to build a positive reputation while attempting to enter into a system with established organizations? To address this, we examined the field of elite‐level amateur hockey. Private Secondary Schools (PSS) are novel in that they offer a nontraditional pathway for players with respect to fielding elite‐level hockey teams. Findings from interviews with PSS with elite‐level hockey programs revealed that PSS highlight their Selection Processes, Player Development Practices, and the enhanced Player Experience in an effort to build a positive reputation. This study contributes to the literature on reputation by showing that novel organizations can build a reputation through highlighting the unique value they add. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties*

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost-effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.     

How Owners Matter? An Examination of Ownership Type in Corporate Disaster Relief Giving

Little research has investigated the effect of ownership identity (or type) and corporate philanthropy experience on giving. In this research, relying on legitimacy theory, we first assess the effect of ownership identity on corporate philanthropy (CP) in the context of the 2008 earthquake in China. Then we explore moderation effects of firms' prior CP experience and size as proxies for perceived legitimacy on owners' efforts at increasing giving and legitimacy. We find that state and CEO ownership are deterrents, while non‐SOE and institutional ownership enhances giving probability and amount. In addition, there is evidence that firm size and prior CP weaken the effects of institutional ownership on CP. This study provides a complete assessment of owner behaviour. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Krazy Kimmy's: A Case in Fraud Examination

This two‐part case allows for maximum student engagement through preparation, in‐class discussion, and through a Part B case that is part of the Teaching Note. Through this case, students work to identify possible fraud schemes, plan an investigation, and perform horizontal analysis calculations. Students will learn about the concept of ethical hacking, red flag identification, internal control weaknesses, and investigation considerations for fraud schemes. Further, in‐class planning for next steps and investigation can occur, providing an opportunity for group work and in‐depth learning. This case offers flexibility for instructors in that it can be covered over one class or multiple classes, or can be assigned as an independent or group assignment. This teaching note provides an overview of the case along with guidance for teaching this case.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

企业并购会计处理方法的研究

伴随着市场经济的发展成熟,市场竞争日益加剧和激烈,而作为市场主体的企业欲在激烈的市场竞争中生存和发展,一般通过内部扩充和外部扩张而运行,而并购则是企业外部扩张最迅速、最典型、最重要的方式。而全球经济一体化的加速发展,中国的企业并购也愈来愈频繁。本文拟对企业并购传统会计处理方法及其新理论作初步的探讨。