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1.
Objective: This study was to determine if calcium fortification yields a higher price per serving in grocery store products. Researchers compared store brand to national brand grocery products in relation to cost in order to examine if calcium values were similar between store brand and national brand products. Methods: A total of 112 store brand and 211 national brand grocery products were collected from three low (national chain store), middle and high priced (Virginia and North Carolina regional store) grocery venues. Products were compared using price and calcium percentage per serving. ANOVA was used to determine between store brand and national brand for price per serving and calcium content, and between grocery venues. Results: National brand fortified products had a significantly lower mean price per serving when compared to national brand non-fortified products (p = 0.0002). There was no statistical difference between store brand fortified and non-fortified products (p = 0.9256). Low priced store brand products had the lowest mean price per serving ($0.34 ±0.24). Conclusions: This study found store brand products have similar calcium content as national brand products. Product cost was lower at low priced store compared to middle and high priced stores.  相似文献   
2.
肖纯  文劲军  王艳红 《物流科技》2006,29(11):27-29
日本7-11便利店在物流革新中开创了共同配送的新型配送模式,提高了配送效率,并成为其取得成功的关键因素之一.现阶段有三种典型的共同配送模式:集中配送模式、窗口批发模式、完全统一配送模式.鉴于我国零售业物流配送存在物流成本高、社会成本高、运输的规模不经济等问题,需要大力发展共同配送模式,以提高我国零售业物流配送效率.在我国零售业态下具体实行何种共同配送模式,可依据选择共同配送模式的决策参考模型,并结合具体情况做出决定.  相似文献   
3.
基于案例的推理技术在连锁便利店订货系统中的应用研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
将基于案例推理应用到连锁便利店订货系统中,充分利用了连锁便利店的消费群明确、信息容易收集的特点,很好地解决了连锁便利店在特殊事件发生下的某些商品的销售量激增与多品种、小批量的频繁订货模式之间的矛盾。  相似文献   
4.
As customers have demanded greater convenience in service exchanges, researchers have responded by incorporating the convenience construct into their conceptual models and empirical studies, but a comprehensive, formally validated measure of convenience remains lacking. This study conceptualizes service convenience as a second-order, five-dimensional construct that reflects consumers’ perceived time and effort in purchasing or using a service. Service convenience dimensions are salient at different stages of the purchase decision process. Given this conceptualization, the study presents the development and validation of the SERVCON scale, a comprehensive instrument for measuring service convenience. The five dimensions are independent within a nomological network that illustrates distinct antecedent and consequent effects, and the results reinforce the multidimensional representation, offering insight into the distinctive relationships between each service convenience dimension and its antecedents, such as competitive intensity, and consequences, such as repurchase behavior. The findings help researchers and managers understand a fully conceptualized convenience construct and facilitate the measurement of convenience in future empirical studies.  相似文献   
5.
Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(1) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-1451]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.  相似文献   
6.
Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.  相似文献   
7.
城市土地储备量研究——以杭州市为例   总被引:10,自引:0,他引:10  
1996年以来,土地储备机制在我国各地先后施行,它不仅涉及及土地收购,储备,出让的立法工作,而且还涉及资金流转过程,所以确定合理的土地储备量已迫在眉睫。本文在分析影响土地储备量大小的三大方面诸多因素作用关系基础上,拟定城市土地储备量大小的思路,即在相关因素评判检验的基础上,建立开发项目土地供应量与建成区面积,房地产开发量二元线回归方程,运用SPSS软件推算出土地储备量的大小。  相似文献   
8.
对一个常用物流评价指标的重新思考   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
邹飞  韩玉麒 《物流科技》2005,28(5):74-76
目前很多的物流论文中常用物流总成本/GDP这一指标来证明我国物流市场的巨大潜力,本文对此提出了质疑.认为这一比例的高低与我国目前所处的工业化阶段和我国运输业的发展水平有很大的关系。最后,指出了讨论该问题的意义。  相似文献   
9.
This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309).  相似文献   
10.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.  相似文献   
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