The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection

This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case.     

Does bureaucracy kill individual initiative? The impact of structure on organizational citizenship behavior in the hospitality industry

In their quest for improved service quality, hospitality organizations face a paradox. Standardization and centralization are generally perceived as essential to maintaining high service standards. These bureaucratic mechanisms, however, are suspected to have a negative impact on spontaneous “organizational citizenship” behaviors, which are equally essential for flawless service delivery. Empirical results from the Swiss hotel industry suggest that “helping” behavior is more widespread than “voice” behavior among hotel employees. The results also provide support for the hypothesis that “helping” and “voice” behaviors are negatively affected by a centralized organization structure. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

The innovative bureaucrat: evidence from the correctional authorities in Washington State

Bureaucracies are usually regarded as inefficient, wasteful mechanisms. Contrary to this deeply rooted perception of bureaucracy, this paper documents the case of the correctional authorities in Washington State, a bureaucracy that acted with a considerable degree of innovation and professionalism. Their task was to administer a risk assessment instrument that measured the level of risk posed by offenders by way of a numerical score. They used that score to identify the level of supervision offenders were to receive once released into the community. In analyzing the data, I discovered an unusual application of the instrument that resulted in many offenders being bumped to a higher supervision level. Using a regression discontinuity design, I uncover the mechanics of the bumping-up process and I generate an instrument that is cleansed of the manipulation. I find that the manipulated instrument predicts serious recidivism events better than the cleansed instrument, especially when these events involve high-risk offenders, thus providing evidence that the authorities had good reason to undertake the manipulation.     

Religion,administration & public goods: Experimental evidence from Russia

In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods. I identify three normative foundations of Eastern Orthodox monasticism with strong economic implications: 1. solidarity, 2. obedience, and 3. universal discipline. I propose a public goods game with a three-tier hierarchy, where these norms are modeled as treatments. Obedience and universal discipline facilitate the provision of threshold public goods in equilibrium, whereas solidarity does not. Empirical evidence is drawn from public goods experiments run with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The introduction of the same three norms as experimental treatments produces different results. I find that only universal discipline leads to the provision of threshold public goods, whereas solidarity and obedience do not. Unlike in Protestant societies, in Eastern Orthodox societies free-riding occurs at lower than at higher hierarchical levels. Successful economic reforms in Eastern Orthodox countries start with the restructuring of the middle- and lower-ranked public sector. Authoritarian persistence is defined by the commitment of the dictator to overprovide public goods.     

Planning and developing tourism within a public sector quagmire: Lessons from and for small countries

This paper examined public sector tourism in Northern Ireland, a small country on the periphery of Western Europe which is notorious for being over-governed. The authors found that its complex web of public sector tourism bodies created confusion and duplication within the industry. There was a lack of coordination and clear policy guidelines and many of the organisations were suffering from ‘partnership overload’. To make matters worse for Northern Ireland its National Tourism Organisation, faced with a reduced remit and shrinking budget, was not capable of making decisions and providing the strategic leadership that is required to drive the tourism agenda forward. Northern Ireland, and indeed any small country involved in tourism, could learn valuable lessons from Northern Ireland’s Celtic neighbours, Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland, countries which have taken action to remove some of their layers of administration and bureaucracy and make public sector tourism more streamlined and manageable.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.     

The Shifting Sands of Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission

This paper presents a statistical model for Federal Trade Commission merger enforcement. After reviewing the literature, economic and political variables are posited to explain bureaucratic merger decisions. Various probit models are estimated with the results suggesting that the Commission enhanced the consideration given to merger–specific efficiencies in response to exogenous pressure to increase merger enforcement. Overall, the tightening of merger policy appears to have been focused on the transactions lacking documented cost savings     

Mind the gap: Disparity in redistributive preference between political elites and the public in China

In this research, we emphasize the importance of studying the gap in redistributive preference between political elites and the public because of the strategic roles played by the former in policy processes. We use China as a case study, wherein the fulfillment of surging demands for redistribution is largely dependent on whether or not the political elites will advocate for redistribution. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey, we find that the political elites prefer significantly less progressive taxation and less redistributive expenditure than the public. The gap in redistributive preference is larger on the expenditure side than on the taxation side. Moreover, the causes of the gap appear to vary by the measures for redistribution. Accounting for covariate differences fully explains the gap in preference for progressive taxation, but not the gap in preference for redistributive expenditure.     

A note on closing the windows: Some lessons from queuing theory

Consider two departments of a government each serving customers of a particular type. We explore conditions under which a reorganization leading to both departments serving both types of customers leads to an enhancement of "efficiency" defined in terms of the expected queue size in a stochstic equilibrium.