Implementation of interorganizational cost management and its infrastructure: the case of a Korean ‘Chaebol’ firm

In this paper, purchasing innovation in the case of a distribution company is analysed from an interorganizational cost management (IOCM) perspective. In this company, purchasing costs play an important strategic role. This study suggests that a new practice of IOCM is necessary that is suitable for Korea's economic circumstances, including the family-controlled conglomerates (Chaebols) that dominate the entire economic system. The strong need to reduce purchasing costs within Chaebols and the Korean government policy that promotes joint growth of large and small firms are crucial factors in the successful implementation of IOCM practices. We also discuss the infrastructure that enables effective IOCM in the long term, thereby adding new findings to academic research in the area, and practical implications of this benchmark case for other companies planning purchasing innovations.     

Chaebol,Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Debt and Dividend Policies of Korean Companies

This paper examines explanations for the association between Korean Chaebol, which are giant conglomerates supported by various government initiatives, and corporate debt and dividend policies. Unlike in the US, the Korean corporate sector is dominated by the Chaebol which are characterized by concentrated family ownership, political affiliation and bank ownership. These institutional arrangements are likely to encourage more debt financing. In addition, the study also investigates whether firms with more growth options measured in terms of the investment opportunity set (IOS) have lower leverage and dividends. Results using observations from 411 Korean firms showed that for a fixed level of growth opportunities, Chaebol carry higher levels of debt. Results also show that growth options were negatively associated with leverage and dividends. No association, however, was found between Chaebol and dividends.     

Political and economic processes in the privatization of the Korea telecommunications industry: A case study of Korea Telecom, 1987–2003

The Korean government completed its privatization of Korea Telecom (KT) in May 2002. Privatization was undertaken at a gradual pace at first mainly because the Korean government did not want to hand over its managerial power to the privatized telecommunications service company, although it announced its plan in 1987. However, the inauguration of the World Trade Organization (WTO) system and the Korean economic crisis of 1997 forced the government to accelerate its full privatization plan. During this process, several main players such as the Korean government, transnational corporations, international organizations, and large domestic conglomerates played important roles. The full privatization of KT is the result of the political, social, and economic demands of these players.     

Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms

This study examines the effects of family firms on the corporate social performance of Korean firms and analyses how their effect varies depending on the presence of family CEOs or chaebols. Based on the agency theory, we find that family firms exhibit lower corporate social performance. In particular, there is no difference in the performance of related stakeholders, such as society, consumers, environment, and employees, compared to non-family firms, but corporate governance registers as low performance. We further find that family firms managed by family CEOs show lower corporate social performance, whereas chaebol firms show higher corporate social performance.     

Organizational culture and the tolerance of corruption: the case of South Korea

ABSTRACT

There has been long term and widespread criticism of organizational corruption around the world. This also includes South Korea with many examples, both historical and current. This is underpinned by several elements but an important and high profile factor is a seeming creation and tolerance of corruption by the large, diversified, dynastic family-owned and run conglomerates – the chaebol – and their nexus with the political elite. This study examines if there is any relationship between organizational culture and the tolerance of corruption within Korean firms. For this purpose, we chose four cultural traits as independent variables: large power distance, the government–business relationship, hereditary management and naembi culture, along with the tolerance of corruption as a dependent variable. Data was collected through a questionnaire survey and we used regression analysis to test our four hypotheses. According to the results, all our hypotheses received statistical support which implies these four cultural characteristics positively affect the tolerance of corruption within firms. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are also discussed.     

Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors

Existing literature on the evaluation of the economic consequences of board reforms has some limitations including: their estimation results fail to show the causal effects of the regulatory reforms; they have limited policy implications for an economy where family businesses are dominant; and there is a lack of consensus on the impacts of the reforms.Using a unique dataset and program evaluation methodologies, this paper investigated the performance of share prices in response to the newly introduced outside director system in Korea, where family businesses have been dominant. First, we find that the positive impact of the appointment of outside directors on returns is observed only when the proportion of outsiders on a board increases significantly and their appointment is accompanied by the lead-and-lag effect of regulatory reforms. Second, the buy-and-hold abnormal return is more evident for independent firms than for chaebol affiliates, due partly to the high monitoring costs for cross-shareholdings among affiliates.     

How chaebol restructuring after the 1997 crisis has affected corporate decision and performance in Korea: debt financing,ownership structure,and investment

ABSTRACT

Korean chaebol firms, characterized by excessive debt financing and overinvestment, experienced restructuring after the 1997 crisis. By reducing debt financing and thus overinvestment, they tried to reorganize financing structure and ownership structure. Chaebols’ debt reduction turns out to have improved performance. However, polarization between chaebol and non-chaebol firms has become more significant. Even after the crisis, firms that give higher cash flows to a controlling shareholder take more capital investment, indicating that agency problems still exist within chaebols. Chaebol-affiliated firms continue to be more active in R&D than non-chaebol firms. However, the pattern is limited to the group of top 10 chaebols after the crisis.

Abbreviations: KFTC: Korea Fair Trade Commission     

Examining political connections to study institutional change: Evidence from two unexpected election outcomes in South Korea

We argue that the analysis of multiple political connections in an event study framework can improve the study of institutional change. Based on a unique data set of multiple political relationships of 4,936 South Korean board of director members, we show that the large business conglomerates, the chaebol, did not benefit from the unexpected conservative election victories in the 2012 South Korean parliamentary and presidential elections. Personal connections to the presidential candidates and to the opposition party were relevant for the stock returns of small firms. Our findings suggest that Korea's political economy has evolved into a hybrid regime in which the political power of large multinational corporations is limited, but political connections still matter for smaller firms. The corruption scandal that led to the impeachment of President Park in 2017 and the long‐term development of market capitalisation appear to be congruent with the results of our study.     

Interplay between dual dimensions of knowledge sharing within globalized chaebols: The moderating effects of organization size and global environmental munificence

Existing literature exploring ambidexterity based on the organizational and network learning perspectives is sparse. In particular, there are few studies dealing with the characteristics of ambidexterity construct in the context of inter-organizational relationships, and existing studies are limited. To date, studies have suggested only vague and inconclusive conceptualizations and empirical findings. Our research tackles this overlooked area of thought by dismantling the mechanisms of ambidextrous knowledge sharing among group-affiliated companies within the large complex Korean business group known as a chaebol and the impact of those mechanisms on the companies’ global performances. An internationalized chaebol is a cradle of transnational knowledge and resource sharing that functions as a business group–level knowledge reservoir. Conceptually, our research employs two dimensions of ambidextrous knowledge sharing, “balance dimension (BD) of ambidextrous knowledge sharing” and “synergistic dimension (SD) of ambidextrous knowledge sharing,” among group-affiliated companies within a chaebol. In this way, we clarify the conceptual issues regarding the degree to which ambidextrous knowledge sharing affects the extent of explorative relative to exploitative knowledge sharing or affects the combined synergistic extent of both activities. We collect survey data from 337 manufacturing multinational group-affiliated companies that belong to 61 internationally diversified chaebols. We analyze this data using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the hierarchical method. Our results show that having a balance between explorative and exploitative knowledge sharing among group-affiliated companies (i.e., BD) within a chaebol increases the global performance of that chaebol’s group-affiliated companies. High synergistic levels of ambidextrous knowledge sharing among group-affiliated companies (i.e., SD) also enhance the group-affiliated companies’ global performance. In addition, our study reveals the moderating effects that organization size and environmental munificence have on the interactions of BD and SD.     

The Treatment of Market Power in Korea

Competitive forces have been relatively weak in Korea. Control of the chaebols' diversified expansion and conglomerate power has been a primary object of government policies. Competition law and policy has been expanded to include direct controls on chaebols, but it has been rather ineffective in resolving chaebol-related problems mainly because of insufficient attention having been paid to the problems of market power. Attempts to rein in chaebols by direct controls, without enhancing competitive forces, will be in vain, insofar as chaebol problems are really symptoms of their entrenched market potions in a non-competitive environment.