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Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously. 相似文献
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Yohan Pelosse 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》2011,47(6):740-748
We analyze a noisy-ranking contest in which participants compete in several dimensions. The organizer randomly samples a number of dimensions and awards a prize to the most productive agent. When the contest is optimally designed, we establish a structural equivalence between this family of noisy-ranking contests and contests built upon Tullock contest success functions. Our result also shows that in this class of noisy-contests, the profit-maximization problem of the planner can be turned into a stochastic choice problem for a planner who has some deterministic preferences over the contestants’ win probabilities. 相似文献
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This paper proposes a multi-prize “reverse” nested lottery contest model, which can be viewed as the “mirror image” of the conventional nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a). The reverse-lottery contest model determines winners by selecting losers based on contestants’ one-shot effort through a hypothetical sequence of lotteries. We provide a microfoundation for the reverse-lottery contest from a perspective of (simultaneous) noisy performance ranking and establish that the model is underpinned by a unique performance evaluation rule. We further demonstrate that the noisy-ranking model can be interpreted intuitively as a “worst-shot” contest, in which contestants’ performances are evaluated based on their most severe mistakes. The reverse-lottery contest model thus depicts a great variety of widely observed competitive activities of this nature. A handy closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium of the reverse-lottery contest is obtained. We show that the winner-take-all principle continues to hold in reverse-lottery contests. Moreover, we find that a reverse-lottery contest elicits more effort than a conventional lottery contest whenever the prizes available to contestants are relatively scarce. 相似文献
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如今如何提高学生的综合素质,培养更多的创新型人才已经成为高等院校的一项重要的工作。电子设计竞赛为此提供了良好的平台,因此学生们对电子设计竞赛的积极性越来越高,学校也越来越重视。通过电子设计竞赛使培养工科院校综合性创新人才成为一条新的途径。 相似文献
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The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi‐dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions, and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework. 相似文献
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The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low. 相似文献
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Dana Sisak 《Journal of economic surveys》2009,23(1):82-114
Abstract. Multiple-prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey attempts to outline, compare and evaluate the results from the literature. While a first prize always results in a positive incentive to invest effort, second and later prizes lead to ambiguous effects. Depending on the objective function, the characteristics of the individuals and the type of contest a different prize allocation is optimal. 相似文献
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本文首先分析了外资银行在中国的发展进程,接下来从网点、产品、客户服务等方面对全面开放后中外商业银行在零售业务领域的竞争力进行了对比分析,揭示了我国商业银行在发展零售业务中的短板所在,最后结合我国金融业发展的实际情况,从明确零售业务发展定位、加强零售业务产品创新、全面提升个人金融业务服务层次等方面提出了我国商业银行应对当前外资银行巨大竞争压力的几点对策。 相似文献
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