话语民主理论下可持续发展中的公民参与

可持续发展目标的追求需要公民的集体判断，公民参与作为可持续发展的基本原则之一，有利于实现可持续发展的目标，也是为避免“公地悲剧”尴尬局面的必然选择。从话语民主理论的角度来看，我国可持续发展进程中存在着公民参与可持续发展的不完善性和公民淡漠的问题，以及官僚式的独白现象。因此，要构建公共能量场确保可持续发展政策执行过程公民话语的正当性和合法性，实行一些人的对话参与可持续发展，通过“重复性实践”使可持续发展中的公民参与制度化。     

The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy

We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time, as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition to equalization. “But the law of inheritance was the last step to equality.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).     

The political economy of redistribution under democracy

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. We find that democracies survive in wealthy societies. Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of capital stock above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the revolutionary prowess of these groups is lower. Yet in poor unequal countries there exist no redistribution scheme which would be accepted both by the poor and the wealthy. Hence, democracy cannot survive. As endowments increase, redistribution schemes that satisfy both the poor and the wealthy emerge. Moreover, as capital stock grows the wealthy tolerate more and the poor less redistribution, so that the set of feasible redistributions becomes larger. Since the median voter prefers one such scheme to the dictatorship of either group, democracy survives.We would like to thank, Daron Acemoglu, Marco Basetto, Alberto Bisin, V.V. Chari, Pat Kehoe, Onur Ozgur for very useful comments.     

Visions and scenarios of democratic governance in Asia 2030

Using the Six Pillars foresight workshop process, forty-five Asian political, policy and activist leaders explored the futures of democratic governance. Organized and funded by Oxfam and the Rockefeller Foundation, the organizing hypothesis was that without a change in the nature of governance in Asia, poverty could not truly be uprooted. Changes in governance needed to be imagined and created from the ground up, not just imposed by the past or the elite. Five visions with accompanying causal layered analysis were developed by participants. Generally, these visions focused on more inclusion not just at the level of voting, but in terms of the participatory creation of alternative futures of culture, technology, economy and polity.     

Democracy in the ageing society: Quest for political equilibrium between generations

The ageing of society looms large as having a huge impact on the future political landscape, and is increasingly being acknowledged as a serious threat to the sustainability of democracy. The ageing of the voting electorate is contributing to the political imbalance between the old and young generations, and has the potential to levy excessive burden on future generations. With this background in mind, this research seeks to point out, through reform of the electoral system, the problems of silver democracy caused by societal ageing, and to suggest ways to achieve political equilibrium between generations. Key suggestions are: 1) changing the basis of electoral districts from geographic area to age-cohort; 2) establishment of a new future generations district which can speak for the rights of those who are currently underage; and 3) weighting of votes cast by the younger generations, who may be at a numerical disadvantage in elections.     

邓小平发展党内民主思想研究综述

党内民主历来是党的建设的一个重大问题。邓小平同志在长期的领导实践中,对发展党内民主问题深谋远虑,形成了丰富深邃的发展党内民主思想。研究、学习邓小平同志的发展党内民主思想,必将促使我们思考发展党内民主对党和国家的重要意义。近年来,学术界对邓小平发展党内民主思想进行了广泛地探讨并取得了诸多成果。本文就此项研究中的关于邓小平发展党内民主重要性思想、发展党内民主重要举措思想及发展党内民主思想鲜明特色等三个问题加以综述。     

新时期背景下对中国社会主义民主政治建设的思考

党的十七大以来,中国特色社会主义民主政治建设取得了令世人瞩目的成就。本文以社会主义民主政治建设的新时期为背景,通过对中国民主政治建设成功经验与缺失的总结,挖掘民主建设中存在的主要问题,对进一步的民主政治建设路径进行初步的探索。     

协商民主与中国政治协商制度之比较:一个初步的理论探讨

协商民主是20世纪90年代在西方兴起的一种民主理论,经过二十多年的研究发展,已成为国内外众多学者关注的一个热门话题。当"协商民主"引入中国后,立即掀起了一阵"协商民主热潮",人们也会很自然的联想到中国的政治协商制度,本文将对这两者进行一个比较研究。     

Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this article compares two different governance modes. It finds that elections affect little on the size of revenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult. It also shows that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures.