What Happened to Kapp’s Theory of Social Costs? A Case of Metatheoretical Dispute and Dissent in Economics

In the early 1970s Wilfred Beckerman and K. William Kapp engaged in a serious dispute. Although it focused on social costs, the dispute raised issues about the very foundations of economics. The differences in approach to social costs that this dispute exposed were so deep-rooted as to preclude (or at least hinder) any possibility of constructive dialogue. This article argues that the subsequent ‘conspiracy of silence’ against Kapp should be understood in terms of Kapp’s very different conception of economics as a social science. This issue is relevant to a broader discussion about the boundaries of pluralism in economics—how these boundaries are drawn and the conditions for a constructive dialogue among economists and with other social scientists.     

To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance

Legislative dissent has detrimental effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party label for re-election, which value in turn depends in part on the party’s reputation of cohesiveness. Commonly dissent has been attributed to “extreme” preferences. I provide an informational rationale for dissent. Costly dissent allows the legislator to credibly signal information about his constituency’s preferences to the Cabinet. As a result the Cabinet can better calibrate its policies with the electorate’s preferences. Dissent is shown to depend on policy preferences as well a the legislators’ electoral strength, electoral volatility, and the cost of dissent. Finally, the results suggests that parties may sometimes benefit from tolerating some level of dissent. I am grateful to Christopher Kam, Randall Calvert, John Duggan, Mark Fey, Eduardo Leoni, Sona Golder, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program at Michigan State University for its support. All remaining errors are mine.     

有限责任公司异议股东退股权制度探略

《公司法》赋予有限责任公司异议股东退股权,这有利于保护中小股东的利益。然而,由于立法谨慎和实践经验不足,该规定存在一定的缺陷。在借鉴国外相关立法规定的基础上,提出完善有限责任公司异议股东退股权制度的建议,以期真正实现该制度对中小股东利益的保障宗旨。     

少数人异议对团队创新能力的影响研究述评

在当前学术界,影响团队创新能力的团队过程因素已经成为一个研究热点,然而在过去的研究中,有一个被忽略的重要影响因素即团队中的少数人异议,目前该领域的理论和实证研究都较少。通过对现有国内外相关研究的系统梳理,剖析了少数人异议提高团队创新能力的几个理论基础,并从中介机制以及调节机制两个角度深入分析了少数人异议影响团队创新能力的路径,在此基础上构建了少数人异议对团队创新能力的影响机制模型。最后,对该领域已有研究的不足进行了评述,指出了未来研究方向。     

Book essay on “The Dark Side of Transformational Leadership: A Critical Perspective”

The recent economic misfortune challenges the legitimacy of business leadership and those presented as heroic, charismatic and transformational visionaries. This book contributes to the lively debate about the role of transformational leadership in business and society. Tourish parallels transformational leadership with cults; and argues that the noticeable overlaps should caution against the potential of moving organizations further along the dysfunctional cult continuum than is desirable. In addition to dissent, Tourish promotes consideration of an alternative perspective based on institutionalized feedback into the organizational decision-making process. This book sets out to prepare students of leadership to critically analyze and reflect on leadership behavior and decisions, and to warn, against trusting too much in the judgment of others and not enough in our own.     

Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.