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1.
Elicitation using multiple price list formats 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Steffen Andersen Glenn W. Harrison Morten Igel Lau E. Elisabet Rutström 《Experimental Economics》2006,9(4):383-405
We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price
list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives
for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing
effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects,
they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive
to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants
are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental
design.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C9, D81, D91
An erratum to this article is available at . 相似文献
2.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
3.
This paper examines the market for advice and the underlying perception that advice is useful and informative. We do this by first providing a theoretical examination of the informational content of advice and then by setting up a series of experimental markets where this advice is sold. In these markets we provide bidders with a demographic profile of the “experts” offering advice.The results of our experiment generate several interesting findings. The raw bid data suggest that subjects bid significantly more for data than they do for advice. Second, in the market for advice there appears to be no consensus as to who are the best advisors although on average economists demand the highest mean price and women suffer a discount. In addition, we find that whether a subject suffers from a representativeness bias in the way he or she processes data has an impact on how he or she bids for advice and on his or her willingness to follow it once offered. Finally, we find that on average people impute a low level of informativeness onto advice, consistent with their bidding behavior for data versus advice.This work was done under grant number SES-0425118 of the National Science Foundation. The authors would like to recognize the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University for its additional support. We also acknowledge the help of Elizabeth Potamites for her research assistance. 相似文献
4.
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining
coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at
high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial
incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or
start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the
key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full
feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination
failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good
coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and
(3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full
feedback.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52 相似文献
5.
Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building
on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we
document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of
uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of
participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a
significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many
others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on
the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision
making in economic situations.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y.
JEL Classification C91, D83 相似文献
6.
We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The
model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test
the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice.
Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by
asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot
games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims
than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.
相似文献
7.
Arbitration is increasingly employed to resolve disputes. Two arbitration mechanisms, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer
arbitration (FOA) are commonly utilized, but previous theoretical and empirical research has found that they are unsatisfactory.
Several alternative mechanisms have been proposed, but ultimately laboratory research has found that they do not offer an
improvement. An exception is amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA), which not only has desirable theoretical properties but
also has been demonstrated to outperform FOA in the laboratory. This study provides a direct laboratory comparison of AFOA
with CA. Also, by utilizing an environment with an uncertain payoff to one of the parties, this study tests the robustness
of AFOA’s performance relative to FOA. The results indicate that AFOA does outperform FOA, but that AFOA is only weakly better
than CA.
JEL Classification C7, C9, J5, K4 相似文献
8.
Nicolas Jacquemet 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):187-188
Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent.
Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts
with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments.
First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption
first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the
Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on
corruption.
Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas
containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability
of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates
how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’
practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between
physicians.
Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence
of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work
from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically
undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability,
strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions.
We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible
threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions.
Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When
introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable.
JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91 相似文献
9.
We revisit the meta-analysis of Sheremeta on overbidding in contest experiments and focus on the effect of endowment on overbidding. Sheremeta assumes, and finds evidence of, an increasing linear relationship between endowment and overbidding, Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) predicts an increasing concave relationship, while Baik and colleagues find an inverted U-shaped relationship in their analysis of a single experiment. We use the same data as in Sheremeta, but employ a different econometric model which leads to support for both QRE and the inverted U-shaped relationship. Following Baik and colleagues, we posit that the inverted-U relationship may be interpreted in terms of a wealth effect. 相似文献
10.
How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjectsʼ belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjectsʼ eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjectsʼ beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to “update down” following unsuccessful choices, than “update up” following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of average earnings by subjects in this experiment) than what would be obtained from a fully-rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple “win-stay” choice heuristic. 相似文献