论企业财务管理中的资产质量管理

目前北京市有相当一部分国有工业企业在资产管理上存在很多问题 ,资产是企业生产经营的物质基础 ,是偿还债务、获取利润的物质保证 ,企业必须将资产质量管理作为企业财务管理的基础工作。企业的资产按其质量可以分成三类 :不能为企业带来未来经济利益的不良资产 ;能够为企业带来未来的经济利益 ,但是因某种原因暂时不能正常循环和周转的沉淀资产 ;既能够为企业带来未来的经济利益 ,又能够正常循环和周转的良性资产。作为企业的经营管理者 ,在企业的财务管理中应认真分析资产质量 ,分类管理。只有做到“家底清” ,才能在管理中处于主动位置 ,并防止决策失误。     

Environmental regulatory enforcement with “green” consumers

We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions     

Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information

In this paper, we study a pure exchange atomless economy with asymmetric information and having an ordered Banach space with an interior point in its positive cone as the commodity space. An extension of the main theorem in Vind (1972) to the private core without free disposal is established. As a particular case of this result, a solution to a problem mentioned in Pesce (2010) is derived.     

劳动力价格、信息不对称与农户精细管理技术投入——基于质量识别能力差异的视角

近年来,劳动力价格的快速上涨已然成为中国农业生产所必须面对的内在挑战。对于机械作业难度相对较大的劳动密集型作物而言,在缓解劳动力约束瓶颈的同时,更应通过精细化的果园管理,以提高产品质量,进而提高其市场价格。然而,由于农产品具有典型的经验品属性,在信息不对称的外部约束下,农户通常难以获得应有的"质量溢价"。基于此,本文通过构建理论分析框架,以果品质量关键环节的精细管理技术作为研究对象,系统分析在劳动力价格上涨背景下农户精细管理技术投入的决策机制,以及在不同农产品质量识别程度中,劳动力成本变化对其影响的异质性,并基于全国18个省份农户的调研数据进行实证研究。研究结果表明:农户交易对象质量识别能力的提高,能够缓解农户与购买者之间存在的信息不对称性,将农产品质量信息传递给购买者,使农户获得更高的销售价格,进而在有效提高农户精细管理技术投入水平的同时,能够弱化劳动力价格对其所产生的负面影响。     

基于支付清算安排对中央银行货币政策预微调机制的实证研究

2011年11月16日,中国人民银行发布《2011年第三季度中国货币政策执行报告》(以下简称《报告》)指出,下阶段央行将继续实施稳健货币政策,同时密切监测国内外经济金融形势发展变化,把握好政策的力度和节奏,适时适度进行预调微调。那么,如何理解货币政策的预微调机制,支付清算系统作为金融市场的核心基础设施和资金汇划的主干道,是否能够通过应对流动性风险的清算安排获取预微调机制的参考信息。本文将对此进行研究分析。     

Finding good relationships – intended and realized relational governance of international fine wine exchanges

Changes in relational governance have mainly been documented in the form of relationship building, developments and repairs related to tensions, or break-ups of otherwise strong relationships. In this paper, we take a closer look at the relational governance of long-distance international exchanges between producers and importers of fine wine. We contribute by providing evidence for several novel relational governance changes, and we document portfolio effects on governance choices. Fine wine producers and importers intend on relational governance for most of their international exchanges, but they may end up being terminated, relegated to market governance, or settle as incomplete relationships.     

论骗取出口退税款的破产清偿顺位

债务人因骗取出口退税款将承担行政处罚责任与刑事责任。税务机关、司法机关在其破产程序中一般享有追缴金、行政罚款、刑事罚金请求权。追缴金本质上为已入库税款。针对债务人设立专用退税账户接受税务机关退税划拨的情形,税务机关可以通过行使专户中的取回权实现追缴金的受偿。在退税款与债务人其他财产混同的情况下,税务机关在债务人破产程序中主张追缴金请求权的性质为公法不当得利请求权,应当选择归入税收优先权的序列在债务人破产财产中受偿。对于债务人破产程序中的行政罚款、刑事罚金适宜作为劣后债权进行清偿。在破产程序结束后,无法受偿的行政罚款、刑事罚金部分应当依法获得免除。     

Discussion of Commercial Banks＇ Personal Business Risk Situation and Internal Control Measures

随着国际金融危机驱动全球经济衰退，银行的个人业务风险也呈现出多样、复杂的特点。本文从当前的个人银行风险形势入手，从风险文化、内控机制、流程整理等角度，论述了商业银行个人业务风险控制的精细化应对措施。     

高职高专数学教师主导作用之我见

本文论述了在数学课堂教学、课程结构的重组优化中教师的主导作用，指出在精品课程建设中教师的主导作用应有新的内涵，应加强教材建设，以利于教师主导作用的进一步发挥。     

Protecting buyers from fine print

Buyers typically do not read the fine print in contracts, providing an incentive for a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers. We model this problem, proving that trade must then be inefficient. We show that regulation which mandates efficient terms raises welfare. More interestingly, regulations which prohibit the least efficient terms may reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to offer favorable terms. We extend these results to markets in which some buyers are naive, showing that prohibiting the least efficient terms may also harm the naive buyers.