创始人技术知识资产、两职合一与创新绩效

以2012—2015年中关村新三板挂牌的180个科技型中小企业为样本,以创始人技术知识资产为切入视角,以创始人持股比例为作用路径,采用中介效应回归法,分析创始人两职合一的原因,并进一步使用倾向匹配得分法（PSM）研究创始人两职合一对创新绩效的影响。结果发现：①创始人技术知识资产与创始人两职合一的比例显著正相关;②创始人技术知识资产通过创始人持股比例的部分中介效应能够促进创始人两职合一;③创始人两职合一可以显著提升企业创新绩效。分析拥有技术知识资产的创始人提高公司创新绩效的内部机理,并证实了两职合一的创始人能够更好地推动技术创新,为科技型中小企业优化公司治理结构和提高创新水平提供了新思路。     

To live or let die? An empirical analysis of piecemeal voluntary corporate liquidations

This paper is an in-depth investigation of 61 publicly-traded firms that chose to liquidate voluntarily on a piecemeal basis during the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison with their industry peers, these firms have lower Tobin's Q, a higher percentage of equity ownership by management and the board, a higher incidence of a member of the corporation's founding family in a key executive position or on the board, and a higher incidence of asset sales and prior attempts to transfer control of the firm. The average excess stock return of 20% around liquidation announcements is positively correlated with the fraction of stock owned by management and the board. These results suggest that firms that make the value enhancing decision to voluntarily liquidate confront low future growth opportunities, but the absence of future growth opportunities is not sufficient to bring about this decision. It is also necessary that decision makers have a vested interest in the outcome, either because of their ownership stake or because of their family affiliation with the business, and that the valuation consequences of the decision are greater, the more closely aligned are managerial and shareholder interests.     

Financing decisions as a source of conflict in venture boards

Governance scholarship has suggested that venture boards should be structured so as to stimulate internal conflict. However, structure is a weak predictor of board effectiveness. Moreover, conflict can be dysfunctional, especially when it is focused on relationships rather than tasks. We show that venture boards experience more relationship conflict when they make financing decisions that involve devaluation of the venture and that this effect is moderated by whether the CEO is a founder. Our findings should prompt venture governance scholars to reconsider the importance of board structure, the value of board conflict and the behavior of founder- versus non-founder CEOs.