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1.
This paper analyzes the trade-off between risk and incentives in the share contracts of the American whaling industry. Using a newly collected panel of 5378 individuals who sailed on more than 1000 whaling voyages from 1855–68, the response of sailors’ compensation to an increase in risk is estimated. The risks used to identify this response resulted from the commerce-raiding naval vessels of the Confederacy during the Civil War. As the Confederate cruisers sailed primarily in the Atlantic, and therefore posed far less of a threat to whaling voyages to other oceans, a quasi-experimental approach focusing on the differences between Atlantic voyages compared to others is implemented. The results are consistent with a negative trade-off between risk and incentives in the industry’s contracts. Moreover, evidence is found of selection among less risk-averse sailors and merchants into riskier voyages during the war. 相似文献
2.
Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news. 相似文献
3.
高投资、宏观成本与经济增长的持续性 总被引:68,自引:7,他引:68
过去20多年,中国高投资—高增长的发展模式以宏观成本积累为代价。增长是中国今后相当长时期的主题,但是以高成本为代价的高投资—高增长发展模式的持续性如何?本文从理论上说明了中国高投资的政府激励机制及宏观成本边界和高成本增长的临界点;进而指出,在开放经济中,资本流动、外部需求和供给冲击构成高成本投资模式的现实约束,政府必须权衡粗放式高增长的宏观收益和成本,制定相应的政策来约束低效率的投资行为,实现全社会的福利优化。 相似文献
4.
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining
coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at
high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial
incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or
start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the
key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full
feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination
failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good
coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and
(3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full
feedback.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52 相似文献
5.
Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts. 相似文献
6.
上市公司年报粉饰行为的动机主要有:取得上市资格、获得配股资格、防止亏损、侵占股东利益、牟取二级市场暴利、满足经理人员业绩需要等。本文指出上市公司年报粉饰主要靠利润操纵、编制虚假报表、补充公告隐瞒信息等手段,并提出从上市公司的利润构成、年报中虚拟资产项目、现金流量分析、上市公司关联交易事项等方面对上市公司年报粉饰行为进行识别。 相似文献
7.
Nicolas Jacquemet 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):187-188
Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent.
Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts
with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments.
First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption
first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the
Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on
corruption.
Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas
containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability
of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates
how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’
practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between
physicians.
Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence
of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work
from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically
undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability,
strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions.
We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible
threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions.
Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When
introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable.
JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91 相似文献
8.
管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
李玲 《中央财经大学学报》2006,(4):81-86
本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。 相似文献
9.
The last several decades have seen increases in patenting activity worldwide, as well as growing issues related to patent quality. In response to these quality issues a recent patent literature has emerged, that investigates the behavior and incentives of patent examiners, applicants, and third parties. In this paper, we provide an overview of patent procedures, patent systems and a survey of the new economic literature on patent systems. Both theoretical and empirical papers are considered. Policy implications coming from this literature are presented. 相似文献
10.
This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels. 相似文献