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1.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Spanish Economic Review》2006,8(4):271-283
We consider a standard probabilistic model of random monitoring to analyze the interactions between a firm and a monitoring agency in the presence of “green” consumers when compliance payoffs are contingent on monitoring and monitoring costs are shared by the monitoring agency and the firm. When the amount paid by the firms if monitored is exogenously fixed, we find that full compliance is implemented with a finite fine. If there is an upper bound for the fine and the regulator determines endogenously the fine and the amount paid by the firms if monitored, we find that full compliance is also achieved, although the optimal fine is now set at its maximum level. The optimal amount paid by the firms if monitored is lower than the environmental premium the compliant firm gets.The author thanks two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions 相似文献
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本文在正确理解农村全面小康社会内涵和借鉴吸收前人研究成果的基础上,重新构建了一套农村全面小康社会建设监测指标体系和监测方法, 相似文献
3.
银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文从政府机构控股国有企业所造成的企业行为扭曲的角度来研究银行贷款策略组合的微观机制,即银行对国有企业和私营企业进行事前筛选的程度及贷款利率设定,并建立了关于银行贷款融资体系的微观模型和理论框架。首先,将企业社会性成本和银行监督功能(事前筛选)引入债务合同模型,说明国有企业在面临破产做清算决策时会考虑到社会破产成本,从而推导出国有企业的还款机制有别于私营企业,信息不对称条件下银行事前对贷款筛选的激励也会有所不同,并提供了一般性推导和数值解拟合分析;同时,事前筛选存在一定的反转效应,因此需要就监督效率的社会剩余价值进行权衡。 相似文献
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Sungmin Ryu Hasan Arslan Nizamettin Aydin 《Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management》2007,13(1):17-25
Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance. 相似文献
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盈余管理与企业竞争力 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文以盈余管理的客观性和中性的价值取向为基础,初步探讨了目前我国盈余管理的相关问题及对策,认为盈余管理对提高企业竞争力有着积极的作用,只有认识盈余管理的积极作用并加以正确的引导,对其有害的部分加以监控或治理,才有利于提高企业的竞争力,以确保企业可持续发展的战略。 相似文献
7.
On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis 下载免费PDF全文
When agents compete for a bonus and their productivity in each of several possible occasions depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times this is checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the effort made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer, 1996; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003; Dubey and Wu, 2001). Theoretical predictions are derived and experimental evidence is collected for two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Sampling occasions (1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece‐rate reward are manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a single‐agent case is included. Results indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower average variable costs. 相似文献
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通过探讨食品质量安全标准与规范以及食品卫生监管问题,立足供应链,从政府、企业和消费者的角度,提出福建省食品安全监管体系先行先试的对策建议。 相似文献