Sources of Productivity Growth Dynamics: Is Japan Suffering From Baumol's Growth Disease?

This study examines the sources of labor productivity growth dynamics in Japan (1970–2010) and investigates the extent to which Japanese economic performance has been affected by Baumol's growth disease (BGD). We find that BGD silently undermines Japanese economic growth. However, the magnitude is miniscule, and consequently the aggregate labor productivity growth rate has not been decreasing monotonically. We also explore how BGD is arising and why it is small in the Japanese economy. BGD is weak because (1) the positive Baumol growth effect is also working in certain services sectors and (2) BGD is not a durable phenomenon: even if a sector begins to suffer from BGD, it is likely to recover quickly.     

Does corruption slow down innovation? Evidence from a cointegrated panel of U.S. states

I investigate the long-run relationship between corruption and innovative activity using annual data from 48 contiguous U.S. states between 1977 and 2006. Using U.S. data allows me to work with a panel long enough to exploit time series properties of the data. I use two different measures of innovative activity: one measuring the quantity and the other measuring the quality of the patents granted. I also use two different measures of corruption: one based on the number of corruption convictions, the other based on number of corruption stories covered in Associated Press news wires. Following Pedroni (1999, 2000), I estimate the cointegrating relationship between corruption and innovative activity with Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS). The results indicate that corruption indeed slows down innovation in the long-run.     

Terror per Capita

Studies on the correlates of terrorism usually analyze total numbers of attacks or victims per country. However, what we may ultimately care about in terms of policy recommendations is the likelihood of any individual being subject to the respective phenomenon. Thus, we propose and explore a simple alternative measure of terrorism: terror per capita. Studying terror per capita across 162 countries from 1970–2015, the associated correlates differ substantially in terms of sign, levels of statistical significance, and magnitude from those when analyzing total terror. We illustrate two cases in point, serving as proof of concept. First, democracy, often associated with more total terror, emerges as a marginally negative predictor of terror per capita. Second, a larger share of Muslims in society is associated with a positive and statistically significant link to total terror, but emerges as a negative predictor of terror per capita. We find similar changes in sign and statistical relevance for GDP per capita and language fractionalization as correlates of terrorism. Depending on the policy question, studying terror per capita can greatly enhance our understanding of terrorism drivers, especially when analyzing data across countries with vastly differing population sizes.     

Stochastic growth: a duality approach

We re-examine the representative agent's optimal consumption and savings under uncertainty in the presence of investment constraints using martingale representation and convex analysis techniques. This framework allows us to explicitly quantify precautionary savings which induces a higher average growth rate than in a certainty setup. We provide a closed form solution for a Cobb-Douglas economy. The effect of uncertainty on portfolio selection is analyzed. Consumption growth rate and risk free interest rate exhibit a U-shaped relationship. Uncertainty negatively affects expected consumption growth rate; such a result seems to be supported by empirical evidence.     

Openness and economic growth in developing countries

Openness and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. — Openness appears to have a strong impact on economic growth especially in DCs which typically exhibit a high share of physical capital in factor income and a low share of labor. In the neoclassical growth model with partial capital mobility, physical capital’s share in factor income determines the difference in the predicted convergence rates for open and closed economies. With a 60 percent share as in many DCs, the convergence rates should differ by a factor of 2.5. The regression results for a sample of open and closed DCs roughly confirm this hypothesis.     

Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model

A perfectly competitive vintage-knowledge model of Schumpeterian growth is introduced to study the relation between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and productivity-dispersion. The incentive to innovate is generated by the productivity-dispersion (latent in traditional vintage models) between new and old plants, rather than by monopoly rents. The model has a unique steady-state REE with endogenous growth. The endogenous extent of entry constitutes a buffer, dampening the effect of research-efficiency and completely neutralizing the effect of population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates. Variations of research-efficiency lead to a negative relation between growth and vintage-lifetime and a non-monotonic relation between growth and productivity-dispersion.     

LIQUIDITY AND THE INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF AFRICAN STOCK MARKETS

The hypothesis that a stock market price index follows a random walk is tested for 11 African stock markets, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe using joint variance ratio tests with finite-sample critical values, over the period beginning in January 2000 and ending in September 2006. The iid random walk hypothesis is rejected in all 11 markets. In four stock markets, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia and South Africa, weekly returns are a martingale difference sequence. Liquidity is an important factor which contributes to whether a stock market follows a random walk.     

Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.     

Demographic and Economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa*

Two of the main forces driving European emigration in the late nineteenth century were real wage gaps between sending and receiving regions and demographic booms in the low‐wage sending regions. Our new estimates of net migration for the countries of sub‐Saharan Africa show that exactly the same forces driving African across‐border migration are at work today. The results suggest that rapid growth in the cohort of potential young emigrants, population pressure on the resource base, and slow economic growth are likely to intensify the pressure for migration out of Africa and into high‐wage OECD countries over the next two decades.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in High‐Income OECD Countries

Among the majority of high–income OECD countries, the degree of fiscal decentralisation has converged over the last 30 years towards an intermediate level. The theoretical arguments for and against fiscal decentralisation point to explanations for this tendency, because both extreme decentralisation and extreme centralisation are associated with disadvantages for economic growth. Hence, the observed trend of convergence would be growth–promoting. The paper analyses the long–run empirical relationship between per capita economic growth, capital formation and total factor productivity growth, and fiscal decentralisation for the high–income OECD countries. The evidence supports the view that the relationship is positive when fiscal decentralisation is increasing from low levels, but then reaches a peak and turns negative. A policy implication is that policy–makers in several countries with relatively low degrees of fiscal decentralisation could possibly mobilise growth reserves by increasing it.