Price-Matching Guarantees and Equilibrium Selection in a Homogenous Product Market: An Experimental Study

Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exist multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price-matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions, and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably. I am grateful to Jim Cox, Martin Dufwenberg, Haimanti Bhattacharya, and the editor of this journal and the two referees for their suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the University of Arizona and North American Economic Science Association meeting at Tucson, 2003 for their helpful comments. A research grant from ESL, University of Arizona, for this project is gratefully acknowledged. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.     

Consumer perceptions of refund depth and competitive scope in price-matching guarantees: effects on store patronage

The study investigates the effect of two characteristics of price-matching guarantees—the depth of refund offer and the scope of competitors eligible for price matching—on consumer perceptions of price-matching guarantee believability and value and consumer intentions to patronize the retailer. The results show that large refund offers built consumer patronage intentions by enhancing perceptions of the value of the price-matching guarantee, while simultaneously exerting a negative impact on patronage by reducing believability of the price-matching promise. The competitive scope also affected the patronage intentions by influencing the perceived value of the price-matching policy.     

Price recall: Brand and store type differences

Price is among the most important choice criteria for customers, whose price knowledge is often surprisingly inaccurate. This study aims at providing new insights into differences in price recall across brands and store types, and their potential effect on marketing efficiency and customers’ store choice. Towards this aim, we analyze the price recall of consumers for 51 food items by a random-effects panel estimation employing a survey with 715 participants. Our results show that customers recall national brand prices better than private labels, almost irrespectively of the store type; consumers overestimate store brand prices in both store types; the effect, however, is much higher for the convenience store. These outcomes have consequences for the marketing strategy: despite a price-matching guarantee for the store brands in the convenience store, the price image is still in favor of the discounter. This result raises doubts on the effectiveness of the price-matching guarantee, at least in this context. The everyday low price strategy of the discounter seems to pay off in terms of the price image. Though both stores charge the exact same prices for their store brands, prices at the discounter are on average perceived to be significantly lower.     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on pricing in experimental duopoly markets

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre- and post-search), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to simple intuition, presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. The data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted. The second essay uses experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price-matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. When costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees increase the posted prices to the collusive level. With asymmetric costs, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device depends on the relative cost difference. Fewer guarantees, combined with lower average prices, suggest that cost asymmetries may discourage collusion. The third essay investigates the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a homogeneous good duopoly. With discounting, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts that the large firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the laboratory data indicates that price leadership by the large firm is one of the most frequently observed timings of price announcement. In most cases, however, it comes second to simultaneous price-setting. This tendency to wait for the other firm to announce its price is especially strong when the level of size asymmetry between firms is low. We attribute the lower than expected frequency of price leadership to coordination failure, which is further compounded by elements of inequity aversion. JEL Classification C91, D43, D83, L11 Dissertation Committee: Timothy Cason (Chair), Department of Economics, Purdue University Dan Kovenock, Department of Economics, Purdue University Stephen Martin, Department of Economics, Purdue University Marco Casari, Department of Economics, Purdue University     

Implementing price increases in turbulent economies: Pricing approaches for reducing perceptions of price unfairness

Consumer frustration over having less money in their pockets and, at the same time facing higher prices for products and services in the marketplace, arises during turbulent economic times (e.g., post-2007). Sellers suffer increased costs and pass along increases by raising prices to consumers. The current article discusses trends in the pricing literature and in practice that sellers utilize in limiting perceptions of price unfairness, particularly when increasing price in turbulent economic times. Specifically, engaging in transparency in pricing by revealing information about price changes to the consumer during poor economic times potentially reduces perceptions of price unfairness. Using industry-common price-setting practices, shrinking product volume, providing automatic rebates promotions, or offering price-matching promotions also likely reduces perceptions of price unfairness.     

Tacit collusion between two terminals of a port

With the recent deregulation of container service rates and the establishment of more joint venture terminals in China, the separation of ownership and operation of container terminals will make price competition fierce in one port area. In this study we present an analysis of the price competition between two container terminals using a two-stage non-cooperative game theoretical model. Our main finding is that price-matching strategies facilitate tacit collusion between container terminals. Numerical simulation is applied to the container terminals at the Yangshan Deepwater Port in Shanghai, China.     

Effective price-matching: a comment

Corts [Economic Lett. 47 (1995) 417] showed that when allowing for price-beating policies in addition to price-matching policies, the competitive outcome prevails in lieu of monopoly pricing. I show by expanding the strategy set further to include effective price strategies, the possibility of monopoly pricing is restored.     

Consumer responses to characteristics of price-matching guarantees: The moderating role of price consciousness

The present study develops and tests a conceptual model of consumer response to different types of price-matching characteristics (i.e., refund depth, length, and scope) across consumer segments with varying levels of price consciousness. A computer shopping simulation results show that a deep refund is interpreted as a signal of low prices by nonprice conscious consumers. However, price conscious consumers are found to associate deep refunds with increased prices, an unintended outcome for the retailer. The effects of price-matching characteristics on search and purchase behavior were also found to vary across more and less price conscious consumer segments.     

Price-matching guarantees as signals of low store prices: survey and experimental evidence

Many retailers offer a price-matching guarantee that promises to pay consumers the difference if they find a lower price elsewhere. This article proposes that the effectiveness of a price-matching guarantee as a signal of low store prices depends on individuals’ beliefs about the degree to which other consumers in the market engage in price search, enforce price-matching guarantees, or both. Consistent with signaling theory, results of a survey and two experimental studies demonstrate that market level factors affect consumer beliefs about the extent to which others engage in price search and thereby the effectiveness of price-matching guarantees in lowering perceptions of store prices. The implications of the findings for retail strategy are discussed along with directions for future research.