A play-the-winner-type urn design with reduced variability

We propose a new adaptive allocation rule, the drop-the-loser, that randomizes subjects in the course of a trial comparing treatments with dichotomous outcomes. The rule tends to assign more patients to better treatments with the same limiting proportion as the randomized play-the-winner rule. The new design has significantly less variable allocation proportion than the randomized play-the-winner rule. Decrease in variability translates into a gain in statistical power. For some values of success probabilities the drop-the-loser rule has a double advantage over conventional equal allocation in that it has better power and assigns more subjects to the better treatment. Acknowledgments. I thank Stephen Durham, the associate editor, and the referees for their helpful suggestions.     

浅谈纯净水不是绿色食品

文中主要从五个方面:浪费水资源.不是自然食品.不安全.没有营养.影响身体健康,来说明了纯净水不符合绿色食品的定义,不是绿色食品,不应经常使用。     

To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Firms’ Choices under Pure Bundling

We examine the economic implications of pure bundling under the settings of monopoly and duopoly. We show that under monopoly and pure bundling of goods with independent demands, the bundled price is strictly less than the sum of the unbundled prices. In the setting of duopoly and Nash prices, we examine whether bundling can be used as a tool to deter entry. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, we show that with low entry costs, entry is deterred by unbundled as opposed to bundled sales. With high entry costs, however, the incumbent chooses to bundle.     

PTE,innovation capital and firm value interactions in the biotech medical industry

Unlike previous studies which only focus on the main effect between IC and FV, this research includes PTE with the gap of resource-based view. IC is a key element in creating a competitive advantage, as it has a great influence on FV. A company may put relatively less into IC if it demonstrates higher efficiency. However, previous studies have neglected the fact that relative efficiency and IC affect FV and stock returns directly and indirectly. The research period was from 2006 to 2010 and the main research methods include HRA and DEA. The main research findings include the following. (1) There is a space for improvement in terms of the total technical efficiency. (2) PTE has a significant moderating effect between IC and FV. (3) IC and PTE have a significant influence on FV. (4) Apart from PTE and stock returns, IC and FV show significant differences within the sub-industry.     

县域金融支农效率的实证研究——基于浙江省部分县域2005-2009年数据

本文主要运用DEA模型,利用2005-2009年的数据对浙江省县域金融支农的技术效率、纯技术效率及规模效率进行实证研究,结果表明三农贷款的效率与金融要素的投入有关,县域金融对三农支持倾斜政策所产生的效率较为显著,金融资源投入要素的配置更趋合理,规模效率逐步提高,但尚有一定的发展空间.在此基础上,提出了改进金融支农效率的相关政策建议.     

Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.     

Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents

We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003). To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion, comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck. A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap.     

Pure jump models for pricing and hedging VIX derivatives

Recent non-parametric statistical analysis of high-frequency VIX data (Todorov and Tauchen, 2011) reveals that VIX dynamics is a pure jump semimartingale with infinite jump activity and infinite variation. To our best knowledge, existing models in the literature for pricing and hedging VIX derivatives do not have these features. This paper fills this gap by developing a novel class of parsimonious pure jump models with such features for VIX based on the additive time change technique proposed in Li et al., 2016a, Li et al., 2016b. We time change the 3/2 diffusion by a class of additive subordinators with infinite activity, yielding pure jump Markov semimartingales with infinite activity and infinite variation. These processes have time and state dependent jumps that are mean reverting and are able to capture stylized features of VIX. Our models take the initial term structure of VIX futures as input and are analytically tractable for pricing VIX futures and European options via eigenfunction expansions. Through calibration exercises, we show that our model is able to achieve excellent fit for the VIX implied volatility surface which typically exhibits very steep skews. Comparison to two other models in terms of calibration reveals that our model performs better both in-sample and out-of-sample. We explain the ability of our model to fit the volatility surface by evaluating the matching of moments implied from market VIX option prices. To hedge VIX options, we develop a dynamic strategy which minimizes instantaneous jump risk at each rebalancing time while controlling transaction cost. Its effectiveness is demonstrated through a simulation study on hedging Bermudan style VIX options.     

On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: Utility-improvements and equilibrium points

We show that the set of competitive equilibrium points of a pure exchange economy are the equilibrium points of a broader class of better-response demands than the usual utility-maximizing demand functions. The better-response demands are derived from assigning weights to all commodity bundles with higher utility than the current commodity bundle, with the greatest weights being placed on the commodity bundles with the highest utility gain. The usual utility-maximizing demand functions are then those in which the weight on the utility-maximizing bundle is one. We also show that these better-response demands belong to a large class of response maps that are generated by monotonic transformations of the utility functions and/or monotonic transformations of the weights assigned to the commodity bundles.     

Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three‐Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction

We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three‐person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two‐person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A's behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.