Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.     

To gift or not to gift: How providing a memento affects a restaurant magician’s tips

Tipping is an important source of income for many service workers, who would benefit from a better understanding of things they can do increase their customers’ tips. Among the many studies providing such knowledge are two studies reported by Strohmetz et al. (2002), who found that restaurant servers can increase their tips by leaving their customers with free candy at the completion of the dining experience. The current study tests how the “candy gift” effect generalizes for table magicians who leave their customers with a souvenir playing card. Data suggest that a table magician receives more frequent and larger tips when he gives the customer one of the cards from his deck as a memento. This finding suggests that gift effects on tipping are reliable and generalize beyond gifts of candy from waiters and waitresses. Apparently, workers in different areas of the service industry can use a variety of different gifts to create a need for their customers to reciprocate with larger tips.     

Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity

Motivated by the recent experimental evidence on altruistic behavior, we study a simple principal–agent model where each player cares about other players' utility, and may reciprocate their attitude towards him. We show that, relative to the selfish benchmark, efficiency improves when players are altruistic. Nevertheless, in contrast to what may be expected, an increase in the degree of the agent's altruism as well as a more reciprocal behavior by players has ambiguous effects on efficiency. We also consider the effects of the presence of spiteful players and discuss how monetary transfers between players depend on their degrees of altruism and spitefulness.     

人们关注的是分配动机还是分配结果?——最后通牒实验视角下两种公平观的考察

本文通过设计一组最后通牒实验考察了分配动机的公平和分配结果的公平对人的行为决策的影响,并分别从浙江和北京两地获取了相关实验数据。采用角色随机分配的简化最后通牒实验,通过提议者不同可选分配方案向响应者发送的信号,考察对提议者的"动机是否公平"从而响应者是否有相应的不同拒绝率。实验结果表明,响应者对提议者"分配动机的公平"有显著不同的反应,说明基于动机的互惠偏好确实在人们的行为决策中扮演重要角色。同时本文通过一组修正型的最后通牒实验从分配结果公平的角度考察了其影响机制,发现分别在保证博弈实验中38%的被试拒绝行为,以及免惩罚博弈中89%的被试拒绝行为,不能被差异厌恶偏好理论进行解释。本文实验的结果在于说明分配动机的公平比分配结果的公平更会影响人们的决策行为,其暗含的政策含义即分配过程的公平比分配结果的公平更为重要。     

Why do firms seek to share human resource management knowledge? The importance of inter-firm networks

This study untangles the social processes and inter-firm mechanisms underlying human resource management (HRM) knowledge networks. The research questions serve to advance understanding of why HRM knowledge flows between firms under contractual relationships and in the absence of formal relationships. The study analyzes data from a complete network of 51 high-technology firms located in a science and technology park to report the structural properties and relational dimensions of inter-firm flow of HRM knowledge. The results from this social network analysis show that the firms in the study actively engage in the sharing of HRM knowledge. Specifically, the results not only indicate the preeminence of formal ties but also of relational factors relating to firm legitimacy, prestige, and collaborative interaction. Participation in inter-firm knowledge networks appears to be an effective tool for obtaining HRM knowledge as well as for enhancing legitimacy and prestige between firms and developing trust and reciprocity within collaborative relationships.     

家族企业所有者与职业经理人关系研究

企业主与职业经理人信任问题在工业化后的美国、日本等发达国家已不复存在,但在我国仍然困扰家族企业的发展。究其原因,一是企业主"家文化"观念根深蒂固,不相信外人;二是企业主受经理人败德行为打击,心有余悸。为了突破管理瓶颈,提升企业竞争力,引进职业经理人成为家族企业必然的抉择。事实上,规范的企业主与经理人关系是正和博弈,互信是前提,互补是条件,互托是基础,互惠是目的。     

Developing a model of reciprocity in the importer-exporter relationship: The relative efficacy of economic versus social factors

This study develops and tests empirically a model of reciprocity in the importer-exporter relationship from an importer's perspective. A conceptual model with two distinct paths to reciprocity is proposed with a set of economic and social factors that influence an importer's reciprocity in its relationship with foreign exporters. The model is tested with a sample of 200 importers who have purchased industrial products from foreign exporters. The results indicate that reciprocity in the importer-exporter relationship is more heavily influenced by economic factors than by social factors. Theoretical and managerial implications of this study are discussed.     

The influence of empathy in complaint handling: Evidence of gratitudinal and transactional routes to loyalty

While most studies on complaint handling are focused on performance outcomes, analysis of the processes that reinforce relationship quality is lacking. Building on the relationship marketing theory of reciprocal behaviours, this research proposes and tests a model of the effects of empathy as a particular relationship recovery investment. Addressing for the first time the role of gratitude in a complaint-handling context, this model assumes that both gratitude and transactional satisfaction mediate the influence of empathy on consumers' trust and commitment. Data from a cross-industry survey of phone and online complaints confirmed the proposed model.