Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

Short sale constraints and information-driven short selling: evidence on NASDAQ

This article examines the impact of the NASDAQ’s bid test rule on the information content of short sales surrounding the U.S. Security Exchange Commission introduction of the pilot programme in 2005. It shows that abnormal short selling prior to analyst recommendation changes were very informative when stocks were restricted by the bid test rule. Such informativeness of short selling disappears when the bid test rule was temporarily suspended for pilot stocks. The results are robust after controlling for various factors that may contribute to this anomaly. Both the shorting efficiency hypothesis and the regulatory concern hypothesis are developed to provide explanations for this anomaly. Additional tests show that the regulatory concern is more consistent with the data.     

Capital market frictions and human capital investment: Evidence from workplace safety around regulation SHO

This paper examines the effect of capital market frictions on firms’ workplace safety. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we find a significant increase in work-related injury rates of pilot firms. The effect is stronger for firms in more competitive industries and with high financial constraints, and weaker for firms whose employees have high negotiating power and with good corporate governance. Further tests suggest that managers’ myopia shifts their focus away from investments in workplace safety when workplace safety is not related to firm performance. Overall, the results highlight how capital market frictions affect firms’ investment in human capital.     

高速下行包接入中小区选择算法述评

在高速下行包接入（HDSPA）环境下，由于码分多址（CDMA）系统中常用的软切换技术会给下行链路带来更多的干扰，因此在3GPP中提出了快速选择小区（FCS）。本文结合3GPP相关提案，对FCS算法进行了分析。