Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Sequential control of time series by functionals of kernal-weighted empirical processes under local alternatives

Motivated in part by applications in model selection in statistical genetics and sequential monitoring of financial data, we study an empirical process framework for a class of stopping rules which rely on kernel-weighted averages of past data. We are interested in the asymptotic distribution for time series data and an analysis of the joint influence of the smoothing policy and the alternative defining the deviation from the null model (in-control state). We employ a certain type of local alternative which provides meaningful insights. Our results hold true for short memory processes which satisfy a weak mixing condition. By relying on an empirical process framework we obtain both asymptotic laws for the classical fixed sample design and the sequential monitoring design. As a by-product we establish the asymptotic distribution of the Nadaraya-Watson kernel smoother when the regressors do not get dense as the sample size increases.Acknowledgements The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments, which improved the paper. One referee draws my attention to Lifshits paper. The financial support of the Collaborative Research Centre Reduction of Complexity in Multivariate Data Structures (SFB 475) of the German Research Foundation (DFG) is greatly acknowledged.     

Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings.     

Sequential voting with abstention

Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.     

Labour market recruiting with intermediaries

We consider a Rothschild–Stiglitz–Spence labour market model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.      

Making the next move: When does the newness of experience matter in overseas sequential entries of multinational companies?

Traditional internationalization models suggest multinational companies (MNCs) can exploit their accumulative experience to facilitate their sequential entries. However, experience may depreciate over time. Thus, obtaining benefits from prior experience for MNCs is based on two critical premises, i.e., interpreting and applying experience correctly. We argue that there is a need to study the newness dimension of experiential learning. In doing so, we aim to explore to what extent the newness of experience matters in overseas sequential entries for MNCs. Moreover, we expect that the benefits from recent experience in guiding sequential entries are contingent on the extent of context similarity between the most recent entry location and sequential entry location and the outcome expectancy of focal entry. With a sample of 112 Chinese listed firms and 410 observations during the period of 2000–2012, we find that else being equal, the newness of experience of MNCs is positively associated with sequential entry and such a relationship is positively moderated both by context similarity in institutional environment and the outcome expectancy of the focal entry. We also compare the effects of the newness of different types of experience and find that the newness of the most recent experience has a larger influence on sequential entry than location-specific experience and general experience.     

Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining

Summary. This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE. Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998