加征关税如何影响美国贸易逆差及全球福利——基于美元本位下两国动态一般均衡框架的分析

本文构建了一个包含美元本位特征的两国模型,在此基础上分析了美国加征关税及引发的贸易摩擦对美国贸易逆差和全球福利的影响,并详细探讨了相关传导机制。在基准模型设定下,美国单方面加征20%关税会使得美国贸易逆差占GDP比重小幅缩小约0.40个百分点,美国长期稳态GDP下降约2.50%,其他国家GDP下降约1.10%,美国居民福利上升约0.60%,其他国家居民福利下降约1.20%。美国单方面加征关税在抑制全球贸易和生产的同时,会通过更加不公平的国际贸易恶化全球福利分配。当其他国家采取报复性措施时,其他国家自身福利并不会进一步恶化,但美国福利会大幅下滑,同时美国贸易逆差相对规模变化不大。贸易摩擦博弈的“囚徒困境”特征在一定程度上能够解释贸易战的发生。削弱美元本位地位能促进国际贸易公平性的提升,进而能减弱贸易摩擦带来的负面影响、提升全球福利水平,并能有效缩窄美国贸易逆差。     

美国对华贸易技术壁垒的政治经济学分析

技术贸易壁垒已成为中美贸易摩擦的最主要原因之一。本文拓展了格罗斯曼和海普曼的关税模型．对美国对华贸易技术壁垒进行政治经济学分析，指出贸易技术壁垒是美国政府与相关利益集团博弈的结果，其存在具有必然性和长期性，进而提出对我国政府、企业、行业协会的政策建议。     

Consumer Brand Hate: Steam rolling whatever I see

This study aims to investigate negative consumer‐brand relationships by developing a “Brand Hate” concept. A hierarchical Brand Hate model is theoretically discussed in light of the psychology and consumer behavior literatures. In Study‐I the Brand Hate concept was tested with two different types of consumer brand haters, true haters, and regular haters. The study found that in the study's proposed multidimensional Brand Hate hierarchy true haters display “Boiling Brand Hate” while regular haters reveal “Seething Brand Hate.” Two additional studies were developed to examine the relationship between consumer personality traits and Brand Hate, exploring which types of consumers are more prone to feel hatred toward targeted brands. Study‐II's findings revealed a relationship between consumers who are high in personality traits of “conscientiousness” and those who Brand Hate. Study‐III's findings indicated that “self‐confident” and “competitive” consumers might also be more prone to feel hatred toward those brands that perform poorly and unethically.     

Simulated economic impacts in applied trade modelling: A comparison of tariff aggregation approaches

This paper assesses the performance of two recently developed tariff aggregators in reducing tariff aggregation bias by analysing Swiss beef market liberalisation scenarios. Specific relevant sources of bias are addressed: substitution effects on import demand, Tariff Rate Quotas and overprotection in tariffs. The aggregators are linked to a global large-scale partial equilibrium model and benchmarked against a standard aggregator. The choice of the aggregation method shows considerable effects on simulated economic impacts, specifically if the dispersion in tariffs or tariff cuts is large. A large bias is revealed in simulated gains from trade liberalisation using the standard aggregator. The impacts on traded quantities are found to be overestimated, while price and welfare effects can be higher or lower by switching to alternative aggregation methods. By reducing aggregation bias and depicting negotiated tariff schedules more directly, the proposed aggregators enhance the contribution of trade modelling to evidence-based policy making.     

世贸组织框架下我国主要对外贸易税收政策研究

对外贸易税收区别于其他税收的最基本之处在于其开征课税对象仅限于参与国际贸易的商品和服务。通过深入分析关税、出口退税、反倾销税三大贸易税收政策的主要功能在内、外部因素的影响下发生的变化,针对我国三大贸易税收当前亟待解决的问题,提出了具体的策略对策。     

Reducing tariff evasion: The role of trade facilitation

Can simplifying customs procedures reduce tariff evasion? We measure tariff evasion as the mis-representation of import values in response to increasing tariffs. In a dataset covering 121 countries and the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, we show that simplifying border procedures, that is trade facilitation, reduces tariff evasion. Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, improving a country’s overall trade facilitation performance from the 25th percentile to the median reduces tariff evasion by almost 20%. The moderating effect is especially due to improving the pre-shipment legal certainty of customs procedures. Among the potential mechanisms, improving trade facilitation performance is effective in reducing tariff evasion due to under-reporting of import prices, as well as in countries with weaker control of corruption. The results suggest that countries can gradually implement trade facilitation reforms to cost-effectively minimize tariff evasion.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

跨越反倾销税的外国直接投资研究述评

征收反倾销税的目的是保护国内产业免受倾销的损害,但外国厂商通过直接投资方式跨越反倾销税壁垒,降低甚至消除了反倾销税对国内产业的保护效果,对东道国贸易与投资政策提出挑战。本文对国外关于反倾销税的外国直接投资效应、跨越反倾销税的外国直接投资对东道国国内企业的影响以及东道国政府的政策选择等方面的研究作简要述评。     

Impact of the 2014 Suspension Agreement on sugar between the United States and Mexico

In December 2014, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to a suspension agreement that set a $22.25/cwt import price floor on U.S. sugar imports from Mexico. A partial equilibrium trade model was developed to estimate the economic impact the agreement would have had if it had been in effect from 2008 to 2014. In years when the price floor would have been binding, on average, U.S. producers would have gained $138 million and Mexican producers would have lost $218 million. However, total Mexican welfare would have actually increased by $11.5 million. Furthermore, the average price floor that would have maximized total Mexican welfare over that period is $22.76/cwt. Also, under certain supply and demand elasticity conditions, the average price floor that would have maximized joint U.S. and Mexican producer welfare over that period is $21.91/cwt. The latter two estimates are both close to the actual price floor agreed to in the 2014 Suspension Agreement.     

国内税的关税替代效应分析

关税的作用机制在于造成了产品在国外和国内的价格差异,从而产生保护国内生产商的经济效果。如果能够区分国内和国外的生产商,实施不同的国内税政策,国内税的运用同样可以造成相应的保护效果,因此,国内税在某种程度上也可以看作是贸易政策。