Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

The heterogeneous relationship between board social ties and corporate environmental responsibility in an emerging economy

Firms in emerging economies are faced with multiple, incompatible institutional forces in their environmental activities. Which of these forces will be dominant and instantiated within an organization is partly determined by the social relationships that a firm maintains with external actors. This paper investigates the relationship between board social ties and the level of environmental responsibility undertaken by firms in China, an emerging economy, by categorizing board social ties into three types in terms of the three isomorphic forces in the institutional field (coercive, normative and mimetic). Drawing on institutional and agency theories, using a sample of listed firms in environmentally sensitive industries, and a generalized least squares regression method, the results provide empirical evidence that ties that are linked to coercive and normative forces (i.e., political organizations and universities) are related to a higher level of environmental responsibility; however, those that are linked to mimetic forces (i.e., industrial peers) have a negative association with environmental responsibility, which is mitigated by CEO power. These findings suggest that the heterogeneous effects of board social ties on environmental responsibilities experienced by firms in a context of environmentalism are at an early stage.     

刑事涉财产执行中的案外人权益救济——以案外人权益救济程序的当事人构造为视角

刑事涉财产执行程序因采取移送执行模式而被误认为不存在申请执行人，使得刑事涉财产执行程序及其衍生的案外人权益救济程序过分依赖执行法院的职权主义。在刑事附带民事诉讼裁判、追缴或责令退赔违法所得并返还被害人判项、责令被免予刑事处罚的被告人赔偿被害人损失判项的执行程序中，案外人权益救济程序原则上应以被害人为申请执行人，并参照适用民事强制执行程序中的案外人权益救济制度。其他刑事涉财产执行程序应以检察机关为申请执行人。除非出现被执行人逃避执行或者案外人对执行标的提出排除执行请求等特殊情形，作为申请执行人的检察机关通常无须现实参加执行程序。     

浙江省民营企业集群式营销探讨

民营企业集群已成为浙江省区域经济快速发展的主流模式之一。与大型企业、跨国公司一起,已成为参与市场竞争的主角。因此,市场营销理论应用领域已从单个企业营销逐步延伸到民营企业集群式营销。民营企业集群式营销是民营企业集群成长的关键,浙江省民营企业集群的快速发展与其营销管理创新是分不开的。为了提高浙江省民营企业集群营销管理水平,本文着重探讨了浙江省民营企业集群营销战略、策略制定及组织实施问题。     

外资并购我国企业的动因及对经济的影响

随着跨国公司在我国并购活动的日益增多，外资并购给中国经济带来了正面和负面双重影响．为了保护我国民族工业，促进我国经济健康持续地发展，应积极稳妥地利用外资并购，趋利弊害，消除负面影响，拉动经济增长。     

对“村财乡管”管理方式的思考

农村税费改革之后,很多地区对村级财务实行了“村财乡管”。本文通过分析认为,“村财乡管”是乡镇一级政府对村级集体财产的越权管理;这种管理方式在对村级集体财务管理产生某些积极效应的同时,也带来了很多不利的影响;村级财务管理的关键还在于加强村民民主理财制度建设,加大财务监督力度。     

以风险协议为框架的化工措施管理机制探索与实践

以西方经济学中的代理理论为基础．建立了一套以风险协议为框架、对化工措施全过程进行控制的管理机制和相应的保证体系，提高了化工措施现场实施的成功率和有效率。     

关于开展航海职业教育扶贫工作的探讨

建设新农村的核心环节是提高农民收入。对贫困地区进行扶贫是党和政府解决贫困地区农民问题的重要手段之一,其中心工作是提高农民收入。通过开展航海职业教育扶贫工作可以有效地帮助转移农村富余劳动力,提高农民综合素质,增加农民收入,增强农民自身的造血功能,彻底改变贫穷的面貌;同时也有利于促进航运业和航海职业教育的发展。开展航海职业教育扶贫工作是一个多方合作共赢的过程。     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

供应链管理的履约策略研究

供应链企业间的合作能力、高价值顾客等是影响供应链管理的主要因素。通过对合作企业特点及运行环境、顾客关系资产管理进行比较分析，提出了限制例外、建立退货等履约策略。