矫枉何须过正--评美国《2000年持续性倾销与补贴补偿法》

2000年底，美国国会通过了《持续性倾销与补贴补偿法》(CDSOA)，依据该法，海关征收的反倾销、反补贴税将以补偿的形式分配给受影响的国内生产者。CDSOA借维护公平贸易之名，行保护主义之实，不但缺乏经济上的合理性，也违背了美国依WT0协定承担的国际义务，从而引起了各国的声讨。     

中国遭受反倾销的现状分析及法律对策

中国加入世界贸易组织后，外国对我国出口产品的反倾销指控越演越烈，已经成为我国对外贸易发展的实质性障碍。其原因是多方面的，既有我国产业结构自身的原因，也有法规建设滞后、企业应诉消极等原因。我国应对国外反倾销指控的法律对策是应该在WTO法律框架下尽快完善《反倾销条例》和相关的部门法，健全反倾销应诉机制。     

倾销幅度测算中的偏颇之处

倾销幅度测算是裁定倾销以及实施反倾销措施的依据和基础。然而,具体操作过程中存在的偏颇之处,使得调查结果总是倾向发现“倾销幅度”,从而裁定倾销存在。本文以倾销幅度测算过程中的不合理之处为分析对象,举例说明了在很多情况下,原本不存在的倾销行为,是如何在现行的规定下被测算出了“倾销幅度”。     

我国反倾销法务会计存在的问题及对策分析

改革开放以来中国对外贸易迅猛发展,但同时也日益成为许多国家反倾销的重点对象。反倾销不是一个单纯的法律问题,认定倾销的过程需要良好的会计支持,法务会计作为法学和会计学的交叉学科,其在反倾销诉讼中的作用越来越受到关注。文章将说明法务会计在应诉反倾销中的作用,遇到的问题和障碍,并提出如何更好地使用法务会计手段应对倾销诉讼。     

美国反洗钱机制及对我国的启示

近年来,我国政府加大了反洗钱工作力度，反洗钱和反恐融资工作逐渐走上正轨，但与该领域的国际标准相比,仍然有较大差距.美国作为全球反洗钱领域的带头羊，其反洗钱的运作和手段确有高明之处。夏我们要善于学习和借鉴国际经验，不断发展与完善具有中国特色的反洗钱机制。     

Optimal Environmental Policy Differentials in Open Economies under Emissions Constraints

Is there a case for preferential treatment of the exposed sector in an economy when compliance to an aggregate emissions constraint induced by an international environmental agreement is mandatory? This question is being debated in many countries in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We address the issue in a general equilibrium framework and theoretically cover several market structures, including perfect competition, the large country case and oligopoly. We identify the conditions under which preferential treatment of the exposed sector is not warranted from the point of view of maximizing social welfare. In addition, we demonstrate that in the case of oligopoly, instituting a more stringent environmental policy on the exposed sector might be profit-enhancing for this sector. This finding lends theoretical support to a specific interpretation of the Porter hypothesis.     

倾销指控与出口企业营销战略

中国出口产品频繁遭遇倾销指控长期以来受到理论界的关注，大量的研究成果从不同侧面对如何应对国外倾销指控进行了探讨。频繁遭遇倾销指控与中国出口企业的营销战略存在重要联系。出口企业在产品定位、营销定价、市场选择和渠道建设等方面存在的一些问题，导致中国出口产品过于依赖低价竞争，易于引发倾销指控。为避免反倾销对出口贸易的不利影响，出口企业应主动调整营销战略。     

法国公开要约收购制度的最新改革——以2006年《公开要约收购法》为中心

2006年3月31日，依欧盟转化《要约收购指令》之要求，法国颁布了《公开要约收购法》，对现有的公开要约收购制度进行了多方位、深层次的改革。从宏观上看，此次改革主要涉及四个方面，即金融证券管理局监管范围的改革、强制要约收购制度的改革、要约透明机制的改革以及反要约收购防御措施的改革。尽管改革的效果仍有待评估，但法国在此次改革中所体现的提高欧盟范围内企业竞争力的决心和表率作用无疑为欧盟经济一体化注入了新的活力。     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.