挪用公款罪行为方式研究

分析了公款挪用行为的犯罪化演进过程,指出了现行挪用公款罪罪状模式的缺陷,重构了挪用公款罪的罪状模式。     

严查行贿犯罪之实体进路

行贿直接诱发受贿．是腐败产生的温床,严查行贿犯罪是当前我国遏制腐败的必然要求。从实体法上解决查处行贿犯罪面临的“瓶颈”问题是刑法本身的社会性、刑事程序的僵化性、配套法律的欠缺性和国际条约的普适性之必然选择。为此,我们应该围绕严查的标准和需求,检视现行实体法存在的诸多不足,在此基础上,从罪与刑两个方面共同着力,既要严密法网,扩大行为犯罪化,加大追诉力度,又要疏缓刑罚,实现犯罪轻刑化,增加侦破几率．以此切实达到严查行贿犯罪之目的。     

中国商业贿赂问题研究：以跨国公司为例

近年来所曝出的一系列跨国公司在华行贿事件使得跨国公司在华的商业贿赂活动逐渐浮出水面.跨国公司在华频繁暴光"贿赂病",凸显出我国在立法、监管以及市场机制方面存在的问题,不仅造成了跨国公司在华商业贿赂行为的蔓延,而且严重危害到了我国民族企业、创新型经济的发展,蚕食了我国的经济资源、恶化了经济环境,成为我国经济社会的一大公害.可见,反跨国公司商业贿赂已迫在眉睫.应尽快完善国内立法,制定统一的<反商业贿赂法>,强化监管和惩罚机制,尽量减少寻租机会避免灰色交易发生,并加强国际司法合作,共同打击跨国公司商业贿赂现象,净化商业环境.     

Private-to-private Corruption

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world's leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects.     

Crossing the Boundaries of Obligation: Are Corporate Salaries a Form of Bribery?

Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) pay relatively high salaries to local people in host countries. TNCs assume that such employees will accept an employeeÇôemployer relationship similar to that which exists in North America, but the obligations and personal interests that such a relationship create often directly conflict with systems of obligation already established in the host country. When TNCs do business across the boundaries of systems of obligation, corporate salaries can be seen as a form of unethical bribery. In this paper, the core case of business bribery is described consistent with the usual philosophical analysis of bribery, and the grounds for thinking bribery is unethical are made clear. The amount of a bribe is irrelevant to the ethical analysis. Bribery is distinguished from tips and grease on structural grounds. The concept of a system of obligation is defined, and examples given that show the variability of systems of obligation in host countries. Arguments are given to show that salaries paid by TNCs create obligations and personal interests which sometimes conflict with existing systems of obligation, and that such payments have the same structure as more traditional forms of bribery. The ethical issues of corporations crossing the boundaries of systems of obligations are discussed.     

Tendency to Infer Bribery and Corrupt Intent in Social and Business Situations: Comparing Chinese and Singaporean Employees

The present paper investigates the differences in ethicalperceptions between Chinese and Singaporean employees. Twocontrasting predictions based on socialization theory are testedusing 142 Chinese and 141 Singaporean employees as subjects. Results show that Chinese employees tend to infer a greaterdegree of unethical (bribery and corrupt) intent than Singaporeanemployees in 17 of the 25 ethical vignettes. The converse isfound in only two and no significant differences are found in therest of the vignettes. Implications for international managersand assignees and researchers in international business workingon or in China are discussed.     

MNEs and corruption: the impact of national institutions and subsidiary strategy

We argue that the pressure MNE subsidiaries face to engage in corrupt practices in their host country varies positively with the institutionalization of corrupt practices in both host and home country environments. We further argue that the relationship between an MNE's home country environment and the pressure it faces in the host country is moderated by its localization strategy. Results suggest a positive relationship between the host country corruption environment and the pressure subsidiaries face to engage in bribery locally. Mixed results emerged concerning MNEs from home countries participating in the OECD Convention for Combating Bribery. Results concerning the impact of the home country corruption environment are best viewed in light of significant moderating effects. When MNEs did not have local partners, firms from less corrupt home countries reported less pressure to engage in corrupt practices locally; however, the presence of local partners eliminated this relationship. Results will help managers understand the pressures their firm is likely to face when operating in corrupt host country environments, and also offer guidance concerning how the firm might reduce its exposure to those local institutional pressures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions versus firms’ experiences

We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that include additional economic, historical and geographic controls.