Moral Dilemmas in Business Ethics: From Decision Procedures to Edifying Perspectives

There have been many attempts during the history of applied ethics that have tried to develop a theory of moral reasoning. The goal of this paper is to explicate one aspect of the debate between various attempts of offering a specific method for resolving moral dilemmas. We contrast two kinds of deliberative methods: deliberative methods whose goal is decision-making and deliberative methods that are aimed at gaining edifying perspectives. The decision-making methods assessed include the traditional moral theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism, as well as second order principles, such as principlism and specified principlism. In light of this assessment, we suggest taking a closer look at two perceptive models, casuistry and particularism. These models are used for dealing with moral dilemmas that provide for edifying perspectives rather than decision-making. These perceptive models, though less scientific and not as good at prescribing an action, are more human in the sense that they enrich our moral sensibilities and enhance our understanding of the meaning of the situation. Yotam Lurie is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Ethics at the Department of Management at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel. Lurie holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research focuses on a variety of issues in applied ethics, particularly within the context of business and professional ethics. Robert Albin is a Lecturer in Philosophy and Ethics and the Chair of the Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Sapir College, which is located in the Negev Region, Israel. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Research interests are in the fields of Philosophy of Culture and applied ethics with a special interest in journalistic ethics. He published a book on the topic: A Chronicle of the Decline of Rationality: Ethics in the Practice of Journalism, 2004. (in Hebrew).     

In Defence of Principles? A Response to Lurie and Albin

This article presents a response to a recent article by Yotam Lurie and Robert Albin in which they discuss and present the merits of casuistry as a method for resolving moral dilemmas in business, principally by developing ‹edifying’ perspectives on the situation, and in doing so highlight the shortcomings of principles (such as the categorical imperative) in generating insights and thereby moral choices. The present article accepts the importance of cases and examples as a source of insight, but argues that the process of conceptualisation involved in understanding these necessarily involves some reference to principles. However, principles and cases are best seen as complementary to the ethical decision-making process rather than in opposition. The complementary functions of these are highlighted in processes such as reflection upon experience, in applications of moral imagination and in the integration of emotive and cognitive elements in ethical choice.