市场分割与土地财政行为研究———来自中国省际的经验证据简

文章以2003—2009年我国30个省份的面板数据为样本,在揭示地方政府土地出让行为合理性的基础上,讨论土地财政依赖对经济增长可持续性的影响。实证结论表明,地方政府分割土地出让市场（以不同的出让方式出让土地）可以实现地方财政的跨期收入平衡,是财政支出压力下地方政府的理性行为选择。低价协议出让被征农地可以产生长期稳定的增值税收入流,高价招拍挂出让被征农地可以产生短期高额的营业税收入流。与此同时,在非农建设用地供给缺乏弹性以及政绩考核压力的双重约束下,依靠土地财政的经济增长模式难以持续。财税制度、政绩考核制度的改革将有利于转变地方政府土地财政依赖增长模式的根本性转变。     

Efficient local IV estimation of an empirical auction model

In this paper we examine semiparametric efficiency bounds and efficient estimators for the case of a linear local instrument variable (LIV) model under the assumptions studied in Abadie et al. (2002). We apply the semiparametrically efficient estimation method to analyze the relation between bid dispersion and early bidding in an online auction dataset, which is collected from a natural experiment conducted in Nekipelov (2007). The results confirm the theoretical findings developed in Nekipelov (2007). The semiparametric efficient estimation procedure substantially improves the statistical significance of the effect of jump bidding on bid dispersion.     

Physical Search

Unidirectional search is an evolutionarily stable outcome in an economy where homogenous buyers and sellers can either move or stay. It is more efficient than bidirectional search. In unidirectional search, it is more efficient if the more numerous agents move and the less numerous agents stay, than vice versa.     

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses the Theorem of the Alternative to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.     

Markets for Tradeable Emission and Ambient Permits: A Dynamic Approach

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor. For multiple receptors, the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential,multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction.     

成本分担博弈与维克里拍卖机制研究

成本分担博弈中的平均分担机制往往导致参与人低报自己的收益率,从而导致博弈结果的无效率。笔者通过在成本分担博弈中引入维克里机制,利用参与人的占优策略——说真话,使成本分担博弈的结果实现了帕累托最优配置。     

Are auction revenues affected by rising art buyers’ premia? The case of early American art

The steady rise in the premiums charged to art buyers at auction (above hammer price) has been underway since 1992. This article, using a stable and bounded sample of repeat purchase of American works created before 1950, reveals that this tact has reduced hammer prices for that art. However, renewed and hyper-competitive efforts to bring more and higher quality art to market by the two main houses, Sotheby’s and Christie’s, have resulted in general profitability. Nevertheless, we calculate that a rise in buyers’ premia at Sotheby’s, a publically traded company, has reduced revenues and profits below their potential in the absence of such increases.     

Are high–frequency traders informed?

Are high–frequency traders (HFTs) informed? To address this question, we examine HFTs' activity in the call auction environment, where speed-related trading is limited and signal processing capacity becomes more relevant. To model the call market, we consider the Kyle (1989) rational expectations framework for strategic trading. The test we propose for detecting informed HFTs in this market assesses potential deviations of the informativeness of HFTs' aggregate (net) demand, from the informativeness of the aggregate demand submitted by the rest of the traders. Data from the Euronext Paris preopening phase indicate that informed HFTs are present in the market just before the opening. Our results provide useful guidance for the assessment of the influence of HFTs’ quotes on price quality, an important issue for market regulators and policy makers.     

基于中国省级面板数据的房价与地价关系研究

本文利用2002年3月到2008年6月中国28个省的面板数据对房价与地价的关系进行了考察,结果表明土地招拍挂制度使得全国房价平均水平提高了13.2%。同时,采用面板误差修正模型对房价与地价之间的因果关系进行了检验,证实了在全国范围内,无论是长期还是短期,房价都是地价的granger原因,而地价只是房价长期granger原因。本文认为,由于各个地区地价对房价的影响方式不同,控制不同地区的房价应该采取不同的有针对性的措施,不宜实行＂一刀切＂政策。