The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

Regionalization, public spending and growth: a stylized model dealing with ‘predatory states’

In this paper, a micro-founded model analyzing the effects of ‘regionalization’ on economic activity is developed. It shows that the spatial division of public competencies can have an impact on the growth rate via the efficiency of governmental choices: initially advantageous for weak levels, decentralization (/reduction of regional size) becomes limited due to the risk of underestimation of the real profitability of public expenditure by local governments (non-internalized cross-border effects). In accordance with the theory, a transversal estimation for a sample of 51 countries for the 1990s establishes a ‘bell-shaped’ relation between indicators of regionalization and the quality of governance.     

腐败与国际直接投资关系研究综述

腐败与FDI关系研究是制度与经济增长关系研究的一个新兴分支,也是近年来新制度经济学和国际投资理论研究的前沿问题.目前学术界的研究主要围绕四个方面进行:腐败对国际资本流动类型的影响;东道国腐败对FDI总量的影响;东道国腐败对FDI构成的影响;东道国和投资国腐败程度差异对FDI的影响,且实证研究的结果一般支持腐败对FDI流入的负效应.对已有的研究成果进行梳理和总结,有助于后续的相关研究.     

挪用公款罪行为方式研究

分析了公款挪用行为的犯罪化演进过程,指出了现行挪用公款罪罪状模式的缺陷,重构了挪用公款罪的罪状模式。     

论政府信用失缺及其解决措施

从寻租的角度,主要运用政府官员和民众之间所形成的囚犯困境博弈,分析政府官员腐败产生的机制及原因,并提出相应的解决措施。     

党员干部腐败的文化原因探析

腐败作为一种社会现象已经上升为导致亡党亡国的重要问题。党员队伍不断地被侵蚀直至灭亡已经不再是危言耸听。然而,腐败作为社会现象,同样也是文化的集中反映。故文章通过从文化角度中的"一把手"封建文化、官本位文化、官系圈文化以及党员思想建设文化四个方面分析了党员干部腐败原因,以便更好地针对党员干部腐败问题采取措施,防患于未然。     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.     

Corruption and Tourism: An Empirical Investigation in a Non‐linear Framework

This article investigates the effect of corruption on tourism demand for a panel of countries during 1999–2009 by using panel least square and fixed effects regressions. Prior research has considered only the linear effects of corruption on tourism. We examine the relationship between corruption and tourism in a non‐linear framework after controlling for economic and heritage factors. The findings suggest that corruption has a significant effect on tourism demand and that this effect is non‐linear. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Negligence Rule in the Presence of Judicial Corruption and Social Norms

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial corruption and incorporates it into Polinsky, A. M. (1980). Strict liability vs. negligence in a market setting. American Economic Review, 70, 363–367 framework so as to analyze the efficiency of the negligence rule. By shedding light on the role of social norms in regard to the phenomenon of judicial corruption, this analysis provides implications for policy. First, more prevalent corruption at the status quo tends to intensify the extent of the corruption itself and, as a result, the effectiveness of the government’s corruption enforcement is greatly lessened. This implies that an excessively lenient policy of corruption may result in an uncontrollable consequence; once corruption becomes rampant, it is costly to bring it down. Of great importance, in the presence of such a corruption effect, the social optimum cannot be achieved based on the negligence rule and the equivalence between the strict liability and negligence rule fails. Secondly, the attitude of the society toward a corrupt judge plays a crucial role in governing the effectiveness of an efficient wage arrangement. If the society can fully accept a corrupt judge, corruption will never be controlled even with the incentive wage scheme.

国有企业惩防体系在经营管理中的应用

把惩防体系植于企业内部控制和风险管理制度之内,融入企业经营管理体系之中是新时期、新形势下国有企业惩防体系建设的方向。文章对国有企业惩防体系的内涵、实施途径,以及取得的成效进行初步探讨。